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INTRODUCTIONt
Disputes among states sharing interstate waters have increased
significantly over the past two decades. These disputes, which involve the
states' respective quantitative shares of such waters, water quality concerns,
and the effects of a variety of federal environmental laws enacted since the
early 1970s, have been of increasing concern to the members of the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources of the U.S. Senate, chaired by
Senator Pete V. Domenici of New Mexico. Consequently, in 2000, as a result
of Senator Domenici's efforts, the University of New Mexico School of Law
received funding for the Utton Transboundary Resources Center to consider
and promote ways for states to resolve interstate water disputes short of
protracted, costly, and often bitter litigation.
The U.S. Supreme Court has made its position abundantly clear:
States should resolve their conflicts pursuant to the compact clause of the
U.S. Constitution. Such disputes are "more likely to be wisely solved by
cooperative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part of
representatives of the states so vitally interested in it than by proceedings
in any court however constituted." t t
The states have entered into 26 interstate water allocation compacts,
primarily in the western United States, most of them over 50 years ago. As
interstate water conflicts have increased, so has the realization that most of
the existing compacts appear to be inadequate to resolve these conflicts.
Consequently, in 2002 the Utton Center initiated a comprehensive project
to develop a Model Interstate Water Compact. A national conference, titled
"Interstate Waters: Crossing Boundaries for Sustainable Solutions, a
Multidisciplinary Approach," was held to address the approaches of a
variety of disciplines that are key in managing interstate water resources.
Seventy lawyers and scientists from across the United States with extensive
expertise in interstate water issues gathered to share what they believed to
be the strengths and the limitations of their particular disciplines when it
came to addressing complex water issues. The purpose of the conference
was to identify ways that they could better work together to support the
management goals of stakeholders. In 2004, a second national conference,
"Transboundary Waters: Crossing Cultural Boundaries for Sustainable
Solutions," brought together a variety of experts who had been successful
in crafting Indian water rights settlements. Acequia water rights and values

t This Introduction is taken from a paper originally published by the Rocky Mountain
Mineral Law Foundation in the Proceedings of the 52nd Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law
Institute (2006).
t* New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
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were also discussed. Perspectives on the values related to water were
shared by representatives of major water user groups.ttt
The Utton Center began drafting the Model Compact in 2004. The
methodology for carrying out the project was as follows:
" A thorough literature review was undertaken to identify and
evaluate the asserted strengths and weaknesses of the use of
compacts to resolve interstate water conflicts.
" A review was conducted of the language of all existing
interstate water allocation compacts and required congressional
consent legislation to identify how critical issues have been
addressed historically. This research was supplemented with a
questionnaire sent to each of the interstate water compact
commissions on the practical administration of those compacts.
" An Advisory Committee was selected comprised of more than
two dozen individuals representing a wide range of
professional areas of expertise and stakeholder interests.
* Additional research included an analysis of the impact of
federal environmental legislation affecting existing interstate
water compacts and a review of compact litigation in the
Supreme Court.
" The unsuccessful efforts to resolve conflicts regarding the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint and the Alabama-CoosaTallapoosa River Basins through the use of interstate compacts
were addressed. Recent initiatives regarding the Great Lakes
were reviewed.
* In March 2005 the Advisory Committee assembled at Bishop's
Lodge near Santa Fe, New Mexico, where the first interstate
water allocation compact, the Colorado River Compact, was
negotiated in 1922. The purpose of this three-day workshop
was to evaluate and supplement the principal issues identified
by the project study and to receive recommendations regarding
specific approaches, methodologies, and topics to be addressed
in the Model Compact. Following that meeting, a summary of
its principal conclusions and recommendations was prepared
for review and comment by the Committee.

ttt Chris Nunn Garcia and Michele Minnis assisted significantly in drafting both
conference proceedings. The Utton Center particularly wants to recognize Chris Nunn Garcia's
role in the planning, facilitating, photographing, and writing about the recent conference.
Chris's death on July 23, 2006 was a great loss to all who support water management
collaboration.
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*

A working draft of a Model Compact was then prepared and
sent to the Advisory Committee for review and comment. The
committee responded with a number of excellent comments,
most of which were incorporated in the draft Model Compact.
" The compact was presented to the American Bar Association
Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources 24th Annual
Water Law Conference, February 24, 2006, and at the 52nd
Annual Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Institute in July 2006,
where it underwent additional scrutiny by water lawyers
familiar with interstate water compact issues.
* A commentary section for each Compact article was prepared
to explain why particular approaches were taken, along with
suggestions for alternative approaches to critical issues. The
commentaries illustrate how the Model Compact, which is not
intended as a "one size fits all" proposal, can be adapted to
different situations in various river basins.
The primary goal of the Model Compact is to provide a mechanism
by which interstate water conflicts may be resolved in an amicable, efficient,
and equitable manner. The Model Compact empowers states to take
interstate water management into their hands to avoid the uncertainties and
costs of litigation and the vagaries of congressional legislation. It is hoped
that this compact will assist states (and countries sharing international
rivers) in the sustainable management of shared water resources.
The Utton Center is deeply grateful to the following funders of the
Model Compact project: United States Department of Energy; Thaw
Charitable Trust; McCune Charitable Foundation; Healy Foundation; New
Mexico Highlands University; Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation;
General Service Foundation; Sandia National Laboratories; Sheehan,
Sheehan, & Stelzner, P.A.; New Mexico State Bar, Section on Natural
Resources, Energy and Environment; Hill, Edwards, Edwards & Kinney,
L.L.C.; John Shomaker & Associates; Modrall Sperling Law Firm;
Weatherford and Taaffe, L.L.P.; and Public Service Company of New
Mexico.
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PREAMBLE
Asserting that, inasmuch as the states that include the surface and
hydrologically connected subsurface waters of the Utton River Basin are
most directly affected by the management and quality of such waters, such
states should exercise principal authority over them, subject to certain
federal obligations; and
Recognizing that the water resources of the Utton River Basin are or
may become valuable for a variety of beneficial purposes including, but not
limited to, agricultural irrigation, municipal and domestic uses, power
generation, navigation, recreation, fish and wildlife habitat maintenance,
aesthetic enjoyment, livestock watering and forage maintenance, industrial
use, and spiritual and religious uses; and
Sharing the congressional goal in the Clean Water Act "to restore
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity" of the Basin's
waters; and
Having experienced that the optimum use and protection of the
Basin's water related values may be constrained or precluded because of the
limits imposed on the jurisdiction of the Basin states by virtue of their
political boundaries; and
Persuaded by the United States Supreme Court's repeated
recommendation that the states attempt to forestall and resolve interstate
water disputes through agreements pursuant to the compact clause of the
United States Constitution; and
Convinced that the equitable sharing and sustainable management
of the Basin's water resources can best be accomplished and equitably
adjusted when necessary by the Basin states jointly by agreement rather
than by litigation or federal legislation or administrative action; and
Understanding the need for integrated, adaptive water resource
management, specifically the need for management decisions affecting the
watershed to be made at the watershed level, as being of critical importance
to the sustainable management of the water resources of the Utton River
Basin; and
Believing that operations of federally constructed, permitted,
licensed, or funded water development projects and implementation of
federal environmental protection or other water management programs
should be consistent with regional water resource management programs
developed in cooperation with federal agencies if such programs are not in
direct conflict with such agencies' non-discretionary statutory obligations;
Now, therefore, the signatory parties to this Compact commit
themselves to this joint effort to establish an effective, efficient, and
equitable regional institutional framework and program for the cooperative
management of the Utton River Basin's water resources as a supplement to
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their individual programs and agree (1) to exercise their Compact rights
and responsibilities in good faith and not frustrate the Compact purposes
through action or inaction, and (2) to make reasonable beneficial use of their
water apportionments under the Compact with due regard to the interests
of the signatory parties in the common resource.

PREAMBLE COMMENTARY
The Utton Center's Advisory Committee urged that the Model
Compact have a strong preamble stating its political, legal, philosophical,
and practical underpinnings. The preamble begins with the premise that,
inasmuch as the management and quality of interstate water resources
impact most directly the states in an interstate watershed, such states
should exercise principal management authority over interstate water
resources in cooperation with federal water resource management and
regulatory agencies in the region. Because the territorial limitations
imposed on the individual states preclude other than joint action to address
regional problems, the preamble acknowledges the Supreme Court's
repeated admonishments to utilize the interstate compact approach
authorized in the United States Constitution rather than litigation or federal
legislation. Building on these principles, the Model Compact commits the
signatory parties to carry out the agreement in good faith and to make
reasonable beneficial use of their apportionments with due regard for the
interests of all signatory parties in the common resource.
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ARTICLE I
COMPACT PURPOSES, WATER SUBJECT TO COMPACT,
AND SIGNATORY PARTIES
This Compact effects an equitable apportionment of and establishes
an interstate water project development coordination program and a water
quality protection and improvement program for the surface water flows
and hydrologically connected subsurface waters of the Utton River and its
tributary water bodies within the states of A, B, and C. Signatory parties are
the states of A, B, and C; the Indian tribes within those states listed below;
and the United States of America.
State A
1.
2.
3.
State B
1.

The
The
The

Nation
Indian Tribe
Pueblo

The

Indian Tribe
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ARTICLE I COMMENTARY
COMPACT PURPOSES, WATER SUBJECT TO COMPACT,
AND SIGNATORY PARTIES
The principal purpose of the Model Compact is to respond to the
Supreme Court's repeated admonition to contesting states that the
negotiation of their respective "equitable shares" of interstate regional
water resources and resolution of other disputes regarding such resources
is a far better approach than a judicially imposed "equitable apportionment" or other judicial decree.' Because the Supreme Court's equitable
apportionment decisions provide a useful catalog of desirable components
of a negotiated equitable apportionment, much of the Model Compact
draws on that background in trying to frame an agreement mirroring how
the Supreme Court most likely would address particular issues. Companion
purposes are to establish a regional institution to assist in the oversight of
the coordinated joint use of those equitable shares of the Basin's water
resources and maintenance of their quality in the broad regional interest
because of the territorial limitations on the exercise of an individual state's
powers. Of course, a compact could only address more limited, though
highly important, purposes such as water quality protection, flood control,
or regional planning.

1. An interstate water conflict is "more likely to be wisely solved by cooperative study
and by conference and mutual concession on the part of... the States ...than by proceedings
in any court." New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296,313 (1921) (No. 2, Orig.) (remarking upon
"the grave problem of sewage disposal"). This position has been reaffirmed consistently.
Time and again we have counseled States engaged in litigation with one
another before this Court that their dispute "is one more likely to be wisely
solved by co-operative study and by conference and mutual concession on
the part of representatives of the States so vitally interested in it than by
proceedings in any court however constituted."
Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554,575 (1983) (No. 5, Orig.) (quoting New York v. New Jersey,
256 U.S. at 313). The Court has "often expressed [a] preference that, where possible, States
settle their controversies by 'mutual accommodation and agreement'...." Oklahoma v. New
Mexico, 501 U.S. 221, 241 (1991) (No. 109, Orig.) (quoting Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,
564 (1963) (No. 8, Orig.) (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589,616 (1945) (No. 6, Orig.)
and Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 383, 392 (1943) (No. 5, Orig.)).
With regard to the proposed initiation of an original action, the Court concluded in
Vermont v. New York that "[tlhe parties have available other and perhaps more appropriate
means of reaching the results desired under the Proposed Court Decree. An interstate compact
under Art. I, § 10, cl.
3, is a possible solution of the conflict here." 417 U.S. 270, 277 (1974) (No.
50, Orig.).
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There appears to be substantial agreement on the national2 and
international levels3 that a river basin is the optimal geographic area for
planning and implementing water resource development and management
programs. In recognition that the use of a basin's water may have far
reaching impacts outside its watershed, such as California's and Denver's
use of Colorado River water, it has been suggested that water planning and
management institutions should be designed to address issues in this
broader "water commons."4 However, the authors believe that compacts are
best limited to discrete interstate watersheds and broader regional issues
should be left to agreements among compact commissions or other states
in the adjacent watersheds.
There is a strong consensus on the Advisory Committee and among
commenters that hydrologically connected subsurface water should be
expressly included in any compact allocations of surface flows. Even if it is
not expressly included for some reason, the Supreme Court is highly likely
to imply its inclusion unless it is expressly excluded with precise language.5
Non-tributary subsurface waters in isolated interstate aquifers are not
addressed in the Model Compact, but the authors believe that many of the
principles and concepts embodied in it are equally applicable for such water
bodies.
If certain geographic portions of the Basin waters or non-native
imported waters or "developed" waters are not to be subject to the compact
for any reason, they should be clearly identified and accompanied by a
succinct statement of the reason for the exclusion. Imported or developed
waters should be excluded for use by the importing or developing state or
states unless they are commingled with Basin waters and dedicated to a
Commission sponsored or funded project.

2.

See, e.g., S. Select Comm. on Nat'l Water Resources, S. Rep. No. 87-29, at 17-18 (1961);

NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FuTuRE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND
TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, chs. 10-11 (1973); W. WATER POL'Y REV. ADVIsORY
COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEXT CENTURY, 6-5 to 6-9 (1998), available

at https://repository.unm.edu/dspace/handle/1928/2788.
3. See, e.g., Charles B. Bourne, The Development of International Water Resources: The
"DrainageBasin Approach," in INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW: SELECTED WRITINGS OF PROFESSOR
CHARLES B. BOuRNE 3 (Patricia Wouters ed., 1997).
4. Gary D. Weatherford, From Basin to "Hydrocommons": Integrated Water
Management Without Regional Governance 1, 19-20 (Univ. of Colo. School of Law, Nat.
Resources L. Ctr., W. Water Pol'y Project, Discussion Series Paper No. 5, 1990), available at
http://www.h2olawfirm.com/h.jsp.
5. See, e.g., Kansas v. Nebraska, 530 U.S. 1272 (2000) (No. 126, Orig.) and commentary on
Article V, infra.
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ARTICLE II
EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION OF COMPACT
A.

B.

C.

Effective Date
This Compact, after legislative ratification by each of the signatory
states, shall become operative upon the effective date of the
congressional legislation granting consent to this Compact (unless
that consent legislation provides otherwise), which contains
language waiving the sovereign immunity of the United States
from suit to permit the enforcement of the obligations of its
agencies under this Compact and to determine the legal effect of
federal legislation on the water apportionments and other
programs authorized by this Compact and the powers of the Utton
River Basin Commission (the Commission).
Duration
(1) The initial term of the Compact shall be twenty-five (25) years
from its effective date. No later than one (1) year prior to the
expiration of the initial or any renewal term, the Compact
signatory parties shall notify the President and Congress
whether they propose (a) an additional twenty-five-year (25)
or other length term without any change in the Compact's
provisions; (b) an additional twenty-five-year (25) or other
length term with certain amendments to the Compact, which
shall have been approved by the signatory states and shall
accompany the notification; or (c) termination of the
Compact, accompanied by the proposed terms of such
termination, which shall include, at a minimum, proposals to
satisfy the requirements of Article II.B(2). Whichever option
is exercised shall require congressional approval.
(2) Termination of the Compact shall be subject to the following
conditions, at a minimum:
(a) Satisfaction of all outstanding financial obligations of
the Commission;
(b) Preservation of all valid existing rights derived from
federal, state, or tribal law or this Compact in the waters
covered by the Compact; and
(c) Preservation of all environmental protection obligations
assumed by the signatory parties or the Commission.
Modification or Amendment
This Compact may be modified or amended by action of the
governing bodies of all of the signatory parties in accordance with
applicable federal, state, or tribal law and with the consent of
Congress.

30
D.
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Individual Party Withdrawal
Any signatory party may withdraw from this Compact upon two
(2) years' notice to the other signatory parties, the President, and
Congress, subject to the conditions set forth in Article II.B(2).
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ARTICLE II COMMENTARY
EFFECTIVE DATE AND DURATION OF COMPACT

A. Waiver of the United States' Sovereign Immunity
The Model Compact would not become effective unless the
constitutionally required congressional consent legislation waives the
sovereign immunity of the United States so that (1) if the United States is a
signatory party its compact obligations can be enforced, and (2) the legal
effect of federal legislation on compact apportionments or programs can be
ascertained so that the states can decide whether they wish to terminate the
compact.
There is a significant risk that if the United States does not become
a signatory party to a compact it may nevertheless (1) be deemed to be an
indispensable party to litigation by compact parties to enforce the compact,
and (2) assert sovereign immunity against efforts to join it. Where the
United States' claims in a compact state are derived from state law, for
example, federal reclamation project water rights, it is not an indispensable
party.6 But it has been held to be an indispensable party where it exercises
significant exclusive federal water allocation authority.7 Similarly, it was
held to be an indispensable party in Texas v. New Mexico8 because it was
trustee for Indian and Pueblo water rights in New Mexico that allegedly
would have been impaired by the relief Texas was seeking under the Rio
Grande Compact. If that decision is still good law, it might be difficult to
sustain a compact enforcement suit in any interstate river basin containing
Indian reservations unless the United States intervenes. In its most recent
decision on the indispensability issue in an interstate context, Idaho v.
Oregon & Washington,9 the Court held, however, that the United States'
ownership and operation of eight Bureau of Reclamation and Corps of
Engineers dams on the Columbia River system did not make it
indispensable where Idaho's suit for equitable apportionment of interstate
fish resources did not complain of such operation."° But would a compact
state's complaint about such operations or the United States' administration
of comprehensive regulatory programs significantly affecting water rights

6. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 629 (1945) (No. 6, Orig.).
7. Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558, 571 (1936) (the Secretary of the Interior has
exclusive water allocation authority on the Lower Colorado River under the Boulder Canyon
Project Act).
8. 352 U.S. 991 (1957) (No. 9, Orig.).
9. 444 U.S. 380 (1980) (No. 67, Orig.).
10. Id. at 390-91.
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in a compact state, such as the Clean Water Act or the Endangered Species
Act, make it indispensable?1
The customary practice in an interstate water dispute has been for
the Government not to intervene but to file an amicus curiae brief, simply
informing and advising the Court of its views without getting into the fray.
But since the United States has the responsibility to see that federal water
development and environmental laws, as well as its trust responsibilities to
Indian tribes, are implemented throughout an interstate basin, the authors
strongly believe that the compact party states should have the opportunity
to demonstrate that those statutes and trust obligations have a significant
bearing on their congressionally approved compact apportionments and
programs, particularly since the array of environmental statutes enacted by
Congress over the past 35 years appears to have rendered the reliability of
Supreme Court decreed rights and congressionally approved compact
allocations questionable.
Given the dominant role of the United States in almost all interstate
river basins, ideally Congress should repeal subsection (c) of the McCarran
Amendment, which provides that the Act's sovereign immunity waiver for
comprehensive intrastate river system water adjudications does not apply
to "any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the United States
involving the rights of States to the use of the water of any interstate
stream." 1 2 Can the King really do no wrong on an interstate stream? Plainly
not so, as Congress has recognized for 50 years in the Colorado River Basin
where the Colorado River Storage Project Act of 1956 authorizes any Basin
State to bring an action in the Supreme Court against the Secretary of the
Interior for failure to comply with the Colorado River Compact and other
aspects of the so-called Law of the River. 3 There is no reason why a similar
waiver should not be included in congressional consent legislation for all
interstate compacts, and the Model Compact appropriately requires such
a waiver.

11. See Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,745 n.21 (1981) (No. 83, Orig.) ("United States'
interests in the operation of the [Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act] and the [Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's] interests in the operation of the Natural Gas Act are sufficiently
important to warrant their intervention as party plaintiffs... .We have often permitted the
United States to intervene in appropriate cases where distinctively federal interests, best
presented by the United States itself, are at stake.").
12. 43 U.S.C. § 666(c) (2000).
13. 43 U.S.C. § 620m (2000).
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B. Sunset Limitation on Compact Duration
The first interstate water allocation compact, the Colorado River
Compact of 1922,14 made its interbasin apportionments in perpetuity.
During the compact negotiations, Colorado River Commission Chairman
Herbert Hoover (then Secretary of Commerce) warned the negotiators that
.nothing lasts forever." However, the Upper Basin states, knowing that
they would develop much more slowly than the Lower Basin states, wanted
their right to develop their apportionment permanently protected.
Almost all subsequent compacts have similarly been of
indeterminate duration, although the Delaware and Susquehanna compacts
have 100-year terms, subject to renewal. Although compacting states have
not provided for shorter compact terms or specific opportunities for review
and amendment, Congress has often expressly reserved the right to revoke
or amend its consent legislation when later circumstances so dictate,"'
although an express reservation of such power appears unnecessary. 6
The Supreme Court has characterized the Constitution's
congressional consent requirement1 7 as designed to guard against "the
formation of any combination tending to the increase of potential power in
the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy
of the United States." 8 The classic treatment of the "compact clause" by
Harvard Law Professor (later Supreme Court Justice) Felix Frankfurter and

14. Colorado Compact, available at U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Bureau of Reclamation,
Lower Colorado Region, The Law of The River, http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/glO00/
lawofrvr.html (follow "The Colorado River Compact of 1922" hyperlink).
15. Consent legislation frequently contains language reserving to Congress the right to
"alter, amend or repeal" the legislation. See, e.g., Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin
Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105, § 3, 111 Stat. 2233, 2244 (1997); Apalachicola-ChattahoocheeFlint River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, § 3, 111 Stat. 2219,2231 (1997); Arkansas River
Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 89-789, § 107(b), 80 Stat. 1409, 1415 (1966); Arkansas River Basin
Compact of 1970, Pub. L. No. 93-152, § 3,87 Stat. 569,576 (1973); Canadian River Compact, ch.
306, § 2, 66 Stat. 74, 78 (1952); Compact Between Missouri and Illinois Creating the Bi-State
Development Agency and the Bi-State Metropolitan District, ch. 829, 64 Stat. 568, 571 (1950);
Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, pt. II, art. 15.1(q), 75 Stat. 688, 715 (1961);
Jennings Randolph Lake Project Compact, West Virginia and Maryland, Pub. L. No. 104-176,
2
§ 2, 110 Stat. 1557, 1562 (1996); Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, § (p),
84 Stat. 1509,1539 (1970); Vermont-New Hampshire Interstate Public Water Supply Compact,
Pub. L. No. 104-126, § 2, 110 Stat. 884, 886 (1996).
16. Louisville Bridge Co. v. United States, 242 U.S. 409, 418 (1917) ("The absence of an
express reservation of the right to alter or amend is not conclusive.").
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
18. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 517-19 (1893) (No. 3, Orig.) (quoted in New
Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363,369 (1976) (No. 64, Orig.)).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

Harvard Law School Dean James Landis in 1925 described the "practical
objectives" of the consent clause as follows:19
[A]greements may affect the interests of States other than
those parties to the agreement: the national, and not merely
a regional, interest may be involved. Therefore, Congress
must exercise national supervision through its power to grant
or withhold consent, or to grant it under appropriate
conditions. The framers thus astutely created a mechanism of
legal control over affairs that are projected beyond State lines
and yet may not call for, nor be capable of, national
treatment. They allowed interstate adjustments but duly
safeguarded the national interest.
It seems obvious that what may have been viewed as in the national or
regional interest decades ago might not be so viewed today. But almost all
of the existing compacts and federal consent statutes are for indeterminate
periods with no provision for mandatory periodic review by either the
compact states or Congress to evaluate how well the compacts are working
and whether changes may be necessary in the regional or national interest.
But just as a compact may at some point become no longer in the
national interest and require amendment by Congress of its consent
legislation, so also may changed circumstances convince one or more of the
signatory states that their pact no longer serves their mutual interests.
Hence, there was general agreement among the Advisory Committee
members on the desirability, indeed necessity, for a sunset provision.
Article II gives the states several reasonably flexible options after the
proposed initial 25-year term and their failure to exercise any of them
would result in automatic termination of their agreement. Some
commenters considered this period too short and suggested that it might
frustrate recoupment of the costs of large scale projects, but any amendment
or termination of a compact at any time would necessarily have to protect
existing rights and honor outstanding obligations.
C. Individual Party Withdrawal
Even with a sunset provision, dispute resolution procedures, and
the possible opportunity for a signatory state to block certain major
Commission actions depending on whether the Commission decides that
some categories of Commission decisions or actions may require
unanimous approval, some states, tribes, or the United States may
nevertheless be reluctant to become signatory parties to a compact, perhaps

19. Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 695 (1925).
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fearing the possible loss of some degree of sovereignty or "turf" such
participation might entail or that a majority of parties might take action
adverse to their interest. Although the authors believe that such fears are
outweighed by the benefits that would flow from the ability to take
collective action on regional problems and the realization that although
certain action by the Commission might be distasteful to some parties, the
only alternative to non-participation would be to face the same
consequences in interstate litigation or federal enforcement of certain
compact objectives. Nevertheless, some parties may disagree and would
prefer to discontinue their participation in the compact approach. If so, they
should have the opportunity to do so upon reasonable notice to their
partners (the authors suggest two years) and subject to any obligations they
may have assumed under the compact. If a state should give notice of its
intention to withdraw, it is reasonable to assume that discussions and action
by the other parties might be initiated to address the cause of the proposed
withdrawal and for the discontented party to reconsider the benefits and
detriments of such withdrawal and perhaps abandon that course of action.
If one of the factors prompting withdrawal is something that might have
adverse impacts on the other compact parties, the cost and risk of having
to later litigate that issue would have to be carefully considered.
Similar language is found in a number of existing interstate
agreements. 2° To the best of the authors' knowledge, no state has
withdrawn from those compacts nor has the United States withdrawn from
the Delaware and Susquehanna compacts. In any event, the authors believe
that withdrawal by a state would be rare because "going it alone" in a basin
seems likely to be far less beneficial to a state's interest for a variety of
reasons than continuing to work cooperatively within the compact
framework, as Arizona concluded after 15 years of refusing to ratify the
Colorado River Compact.21
One commenter considered the withdrawal option a bad idea given
the time, effort, and expense of putting a compact together, but those same
considerations also might well dictate a decision by a disgruntled party not
to withdraw. More important, moreover, is that if the withdrawal option is

20. Article V of the Chesapeake Bay Commission Agreement, for example, allows a state
to withdraw from the agreement by act of its legislature. Va. Code Ann. § 30-253 (2004). Similar
language is found in other compacts. Great Lakes Basin Compact, art. VIII, 82 Stat. 414, 418
(1968); Jennings Randolph Lake Project Compact, art. V.5.7, 110 Stat. 1557, 1561 (1996);
Potomac River Basin Interstate Compact, art. VII, 84 Stat. 856,860 (1970); Tennessee River Basin
Water Pollution Control Compact, art. XIII, 72 Stat. 823, 827 (1958); Wabash Valley Compact,
art. VII, 73 Stat. 694, 698 (1959). In addition, the Delaware River Compact, art. 1, § 1.4, 75 Stat.
688, 691 (1961), and the Susquehanna River Compact, art. 1, § 1.4, 84 Stat. 1509, 1512 (1970),
allow Congress "to withdraw the federal government as a party to this compact...."
21. See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 558, n.24 (1963) (No. 8, Orig.).
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what it takes to persuade a reluctant party to participate in the first place,
it should be available. An intriguing argument has been made as to how a
state might in any event "escape an unsatisfactory compact allocation and
obtain a more favorable one. " '

22. See Douglas L. Grant, InterstateWater Allocation Compacts: When the Virtue of Permanence
Becomes the Vice of Inflexibility, 74 U. CoLO. L. REv. 105, 109 (2003).
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ARTICLE III
DEFINITIONS
As used in this Compact or in any order, rule, regulation, or guideline
issued pursuant to this Compact, the following definitions shall apply.
A.
Advisory Committee: The multi-interest, multi-disciplinary
committee the Commission is required to establish comprised of
representatives of the general public with recognized interests in
the water resources of the Utton River Basin for beneficial
purposes, regional representatives of federal water resources
agencies with programs in the Basin, and academicians or private
consultants with recognized expertise in specific water resource
related disciplines.
B.
Base Apportionments: The interstate allocations of Utton River Basin
flows made by the Compact to each signatory state for (1) the
maintenance of adequate stream flows for environmental purposes
and (2) satisfaction of all state, federal, and tribal water rights
perfected under applicable law as of the effective date of the
Compact.
C.
Chargeability:Flow usage subjecting a state's base and supplemental
apportionments to debiting as a result of its dedication to flow
maintenance or reasonable beneficial consumptive use.
D.
Commission: The administrative entity with final authority to
administer this Compact, comprised of the governors of each
signatory state, a Tribal representative, and a federal
representative.
E.
Conjunctive Use: The coordinated use of surface and subsurface
waters of the Basin and its natural and artificial reservoirs to make
optimum use of such waters and facilities.
F.
Council: The Commission's basic policymaking unit, comprised of
state, federal, and Tribal representatives.
G.
Dispute Resolution: The procedures and guidelines for facilitating
resolution of disputes among the signatory parties, either by (1)
agreement or (2) administrative determination, as to the meaning
of the Compact or the legal effect of actions taken under it.
H.
Division of Scientific Analysis: The unit of the Commission with
responsibility for the development and evaluation of scientific and
technical data needed or useful in administering the Compact.
I.
PerfectedWater Right: A water right (1) acquired in accordance with
state law that has been exercised by the actual diversion and/or
beneficial use of a specific quantity of water in accordance with
state law, or (2) created by a reservation under federal law of an
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amount of uncommitted water reasonably necessary to serve the
primary purposes of specific federal establishments or programs.
Reasonable Beneficial Use: The application of water to a beneficial use
in an amount reasonably necessary to satisfy such use under state,
federal, or tribal law.
Safe Annual Yield: The amount of water that can be withdrawn
annually from a surface or sub-surface water resource without
serious water quality, net storage, environmental, or social
consequences.
Species and Habitat Protection: The maintenance of stream flows
adequate to maintain a productive habitat for the preservation of
the normal evolutionary development of identifiable species and
their habitat.
Subsurface Water: All waters below the surface of the ground
whether or not hydrologically connected to surface waters.
Supplemental Apportionments: Apportionments made by the
Commission to one or more signatory states from waters
determined by the Commission to be surplus to the base
apportionments made by the Compact.
Water Quality Protection Program: The allocation and
implementation of authority between the signatory states and the
Commission to meet the requirements of the Clean Water Act on
the Basin's intrastate tributaries and the interstate main stem of the
Utton River Basin, respectively.
Water Resources Management Program:The Commission's
coordination and assistance to the signatory parties' development
of water supplies adequate to meet the Basin's long- and short-term
water requirements.
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ARTICLE III COMMENTARY
DEFINITIONS
Sections containing definitions are common features of interstate
water compacts. These sections reflect one of two approaches to the need
to provide applicable definitions. One approach is to include a long list of
compact terms and the definitions of those terms. The alternative approach
is to include relatively few definitions and to authorize whatever
administrative entity is created by the compact to define additional terms
as needed. In either case, accurate and clearly stated definitions are
important to the success of an interstate water compact.
The Model Compact reflects the second approach. Of the terms
used in the Model Compact, only sixteen are defined. Under Article
IV.B(3)(a), the Commission has the authority to define additional terms if
the Commission determines that such definitions are necessary. It is the
opinion of the authors that this approach is preferable to the alternative
mentioned above. Given that interstate compacts once ratified become both
state and federal law, any change to the provisions of a compact would
require the compact to be amended. This in turn would require both state
and federal approval, a time-consuming process that has been used
relatively infrequently. If a large number of terms are defined in the
compact, however, a revision to the definition of any of the terms would
require the compact to be amended.
An ongoing theme identified both by the Advisory Committee and
in the literature is the need for compact administrative entities to have
sufficient discretion, authority, and flexibility to respond to changing
conditions. 23 Having a large number of terms defined in the compact could
have the effect of restricting the flexibility needed by the administrative
entity.
The terms that are defined in the Model Compact fall into two
general categories. The first category includes terms that relate to the
structure and function of the Commission. This category includes
definitions for the Advisory Committee (Article III.A), the Commission
(Article III.D), the Council (Article III.F), dispute resolution (Article III.G),
the Division of Scientific Analysis (Article III.H), the Water Quality

23. See, e.g., Kyle E. Schilling, The Futurefor Water Resources Planningand Decision Making
Models, WATER REsouRcEs UPDATE, No. 111, Spring 1998, at 62; Douglas Kenney, Institutional
Options for the Colorado River, 31 WATER REsouRcEs BULL. 837 (1995) [hereinafter Kenney,
Institutional Options]. See also Lawrence J. MacDonnell et al., The Law of the Colorado River:
Coping with Severe Sustained Drought, 31 WATER REsouRcEs BULL. 825 (1995).

40
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Protection Program (Article II.0), and the Water Resources Management
Program (Article III.P).
The second category includes terms relevant to the apportionment
and management of interstate water resources. Included within this
category are definitions for base apportionments (Article III.B),
chargeability (Article III.C), conjunctive use (Article III.E), perfected water
right (Article III.I), reasonable beneficial use (Article III.J), safe annual yield
(Article III.K), species and habitat protection (Article III.L), subsurface water
(Article III.M), and supplemental apportionments (Article III.N).
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ARTICLE IV
THE UTTON RIVER BASIN COMMISSION
A.

B.

Establishmentand Structure
The rights and obligations established by this Compact and the
programs authorized by it shall be implemented, supervised, and
enforced by an interstate administrative entity entitled the Utton
River Basin Commission (the Commission). The Commission shall
be supported internally by a Council and a Division of Scientific
Analysis (the Division) to which certain Commission authorities
and responsibilities are delegated herein.
The Commission
(1) Members of the Commission
The members of the Commission shall be (a) the governors of
the signatory states, (b) a single Tribal representative of all
Indian tribes holding adjudicated water rights to Basin waters
or who are parties to water rights settlement agreements, to
be selected by such tribes, and (c) a federal representative
with recognized expertise in water resources management
appointed by the President after consultation with the federal
departments and independent agencies carrying out
programs in the Basin. The federal representative shall
actively participate in the Commission's deliberations and
shall coordinate the views of all federal agencies in the Basin
with water related development, management, or regulatory
responsibilities and present a single, coordinated federal
position, including non-binding suggestions, comments, and
recommendations, in the Commission's deliberations on
matters before it. Each member of the Commission shall
designate an alternate to serve in his/her place when
necessary, selected in accordance with applicable law.
(2) Chair of the Commission
The Commission shall have a rotating chair, selected from the
membership of the Commission at its organizational meeting,
for such term and with such responsibilities and provisions
for succession as the Commission may provide.
(3) General Powers of the Commission
With regard to the waters subject to this Compact, the
Commission shall have the power, under the laws of the
signatory parties or this Article, whichever is broader, to:
(a) Adopt rules, regulations, and bylaws as needed to
implement this Compact and to govern the conduct of
the Commission.
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Sue and be sued in any court of competent jurisdiction.
Enter into agreements or contracts, where appropriate,
in order to accomplish the purposes of this Compact.
Appoint an executive director authorized to employ
necessary professional, technical, clerical, and other staff
and consultants and fix their qualifications, duties,
compensation, and status with the goal of maintaining
a high level of executive and technical expertise on a
continuing basis.
Create committees, subcommittees, and special advisory
groups and delegate responsibilities thereto.
Financial:
(i)
Seek and accept funds, services, or other forms of
aid from any lawful source.
(ii) Borrow money.
(iii) Issue negotiable bonds and other evidences of
indebtedness in accordance with the laws of any
of the signatory parties.
(aa) All such bonds and evidences of indebtedness shall be payable solely out of the
properties and revenues of the Commission.
(bb) The Commission shall have no power to
pledge the credit of any signatory party or its
political subdivisions.
(iv) Levy and collect taxes and special assessments by
any one or more of the following methods upon
property benefited by any Commission project or
program:
(aa) By a percentage of the tax value of the
property assessed;
(bb) In proportion to the benefits that result from
the project; or
(cc) By the foot front of the property bounding
and abutting upon the project.
(v) Establish a basin fund into which revenues could
be deposited at the discretion of the Commission.
(vi) Expend funds for any lawful purpose.
Develop and implement the Water Quality Protection
Program and the Water Resources Management
Program provided for in Articles VI and VII,
respectively.
Monitor compliance with the interstate water
apportionments and enforce apportionment ceilings and
reasonable beneficial use limitations.
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(i)

Monitor water quality in accordance with applicable
Clean Water Act requirements.
(j) Monitor land use activities affecting water quality.
(k) Facilitate and exercise approval authority with respect
to voluntary interstate and interbasin water transfers,
water marketing, and water banking.
(1) Acquire (including through the use of its independent
eminent domain authority), construct, operate, and
maintain projects, facilities, properties, licenses,
activities, and services determined by the Commission
to be necessary, convenient, or useful for the purposes
of this Compact, and charge user fees for the use of
same; provided that the Commission shall not construct
or undertake any project that has been included in the
Water Resources Management Program that one or
more signatory parties are willing to construct or
undertake in accordance with that program.
(m) Establish recommended standards of planning, design,
and operation of projects and facilities in the Basin that
substantially affect interstate water resources, including,
without limitation, water diversion and storage
facilities, desalination facilities, water and waste
treatment plants, trunk mains for water distribution,
flood protection, watershed management programs,
and subsurface water recharging operations.
(n) Conduct and sponsor research on relevant aspects of
present and future water resources use, conservation,
management, development, control, and protection.
(o) Compile and coordinate systematic stream stage and
subsurface water level forecasting data (including
gauging where appropriate) and publicize such
information as needed for water uses, flood warning,
quality maintenance, or other purposes.
(p) Participate with other governmental and nongovernmental entities in carrying out the purposes of
this Compact.
(q) Participate in any federal, state, or tribal executive,
legislative, or judicial proceeding, the result of which
may have an effect on the purposes of this Compact.
(r) Interpret ambiguous Compact provisions.
(s) Take action on matters not expressly addressed by the
Compact or the federal consent legislation and exercise
authority as necessary, appropriate, and relevant to
carry out the basic Compact purposes that does not
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conflict with such purposes, any express Compact
provision, or other federal law.
(t) Exercise such additional powers and duties as may
hereafter be delegated to or conferred upon it by the
legislatures of the signatory states and Congress.
In exercising the foregoing powers, the Commission is
directed to utilize, to the fullest extent it finds feasible and
advantageous, such existing governmental agencies as are
willing and able, in the Commission's judgment, to be so
utilized.
(4) Principal Duties of the Commission
The Commission shall exercise final authority and
responsibility for (a) the equitable, efficient, and sustainable
use of the water apportionments; (b) the management of the
water quality programs under this Compact; and (c) the
management of the water resources programs under this
Compact. It shall instruct, advise, and assist, as appropriate,
the Council and Division in carrying out their delegated
responsibilities.
The Council
(1) The Council shall be comprised of the two highest ranking
state officials from each signatory state overseeing water
allocation and management and water quality regulation, two
Tribal representatives with expertise in water allocation and
water quality regulation selected by the Basin tribes, and two
federal representatives selected by the Commission's federal
representative from federal agencies with significant
programs in the Compact's jurisdiction. It shall be chaired by
a Secretary appointed by the Commission.
(2) The Council's duties shall include:
(a) Preparation and implementation of the Water Quality
Protection Program and the Water Resources
Management Program provided for in Articles VI and
VII, respectively.
(b) Determination of water available for supplemental
apportionment under Article V.D and the terms,
conditions, and price for such apportionments.
(c) Review for approval proposed water diversion, storage,
or treatment projects with significant interstate effects,
interstate and interbasin water transfers, water
marketing, or water banking.
(d) Enforcement of Commission programs and orders.
(e) Coordination of Commission action with state and
federal agencies.
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(f)
(g)

D.

Addressing disputes referred to it by the Commission.
Recommending possible adjustments to existing and
proposed apportionments.
(h) Any other duties assigned to it by the Commission.
The Division of Scientific Analysis
(1) Division membership shall be composed of an equal number
of members from each signatory party. Members must have
recognized expertise in surface and subsurface water
hydrology and modeling, operation of water storage and
diversion projects, water resource economics, water quality,
and fish and wildlife.
(2) The Division's primary duties shall be to provide multidisciplinary scientific and technical support to the
Commission and the Council, including the following:
(a) Monitoring
compliance
with the Compact
apportionments provided for in Article V, the Water
Quality Protection Program and the Water Resources
Management Program provided for in Articles VI and
VII, respectively, and recommend possible adjustments
thereto based on new economic, demographic,
hydrologic, and environmental data.
(b) Review of proposed water storage and diversion
projects for economic benefits and costs, environmental
impacts, and consistency with Commission programs.
(c) Development of a basinwide species and habitat
protection and recovery program designed, to the
maximum extent practicable, to preclude the need to list
a species as threatened or endangered under the
Endangered Species Act or similar state or tribal laws.
(d) Coordination with appropriate state, tribal, and federal
agencies of the operation of projects covered by the
Commission's Water Resources Management Program
with respect to storage and releases of project water for
water supply, flow maintenance, power generation, and
flood control purposes.
(e) Establishment of a data bank of essential and reliable
technical and scientific data for use in the
administration of the Compact and utilization of such
data in appropriate numeric models.
(i) The Division may (1) request the signatory parties
to develop such data on a uniform basis, (2) utilize
data developed by federal agencies or academic
institutions, (3) develop it independently, or (4)
rely on combinations thereof.
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Upon request of a Division member, any of the
data that the Division proposes to utilize to carry
out its duties shall be referred to one or more
technical or scientific experts for peer review.
(iii) The Division's generation, acceptance, review, and
utilization of any data in the Commission's
programs shall create a rebuttable presumption of
validity in Commission dispute resolution
proceedings or administrative or judicial litigation.
(f) Any other duties assigned to it by the Commission.
Commission, Council, and Division Decisions
(1) A Commission decision on any matter shall constitute final
agency action on that matter.
(2) A decision by either the Council or the Division on matters
within their jurisdiction shall constitute final action of the
Commission 60 days thereafter unless (a) either unit refers it
to the Commission for approval within 30 days, or (b) the
Commission requests within 60 days that the matter be
referred to it for review. Any signatory party may petition the
Commission to review a Council or Division decision within
30 days of the decision.
Meetings and Voting
(1) The Commission shall establish rules for the frequency,
notification, and conduct of all meetings of the Commission,
Council, Division, and Advisory Committee. Except as
provided in Article XI.B(3), all meetings with the Advisory
Committee or for the purpose of obtaining other views or
information and for such other purposes as the Commission
may provide shall be open to the public, subject to any
exceptions under state, tribal, or federal law.
(2) The attendance of a majority of the members of the
Commission, Council, or Division, including the tribal and
federal representatives, at a meeting of such entity shall
constitute a quorum.
(3) The Commission shall establish by unanimous decision the
categories of Commission decisions requiring either
unanimous or lesser votes. Tie votes on the Commission shall
be referred for dispute resolution pursuant to Article VIII.
(4) Decisions by the Council shall be by majority vote of eligible
voting representatives. Tie votes on the Council shall be
resolved by vote of the Council Secretary.
(5) Decisions by the Division shall be by majority vote of eligible
voting representatives. Tie votes on the Division shall be
referred to the Council for resolution.
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ARTICLE IV COMMENTARY
THE uTrON RIVER BASIN COMMISSION

A. Establishmentand Structure
Article IV.A of the Model Compact provides for the establishment
and structure of the Commission. Though not every interstate water
compact will necessarily require the establishment of a commission,24
experience suggests that some type of administrative entity will be required
for implementation of most compacts. The Commission can be downsized
or reconfigured to the needs of a smaller basin with fewer or more modest
programs.
The approach embodied in the Model Compact, particularly with
regard to program and decisional responsibilities, is modeled loosely on the
Murray-Darling River Basin Agreement of 1992 among four Australian
states (New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, and Victoria), the
Australian Capital Territory, and the Commonwealth of Australia.'
Analogous to the authority of the Utton River Basin Commission, policies
applicable in the Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) are established by the MDB
Ministerial Council. Each of the aforementioned governmental entities is

24. See, e.g., La Plata River Compact, 43 Stat. 796 (1925). See also Kenneth W. Knox, The La
PlataRiver Compact: Administrationofan Ephemeral River in theArid Southwest, 5 U. DENV. WATER
L. REv. 104 (2001) [hereinafter Knox, La PlataRiver Compact].
25. The Murray-Darling Basin (MDB) covers over one million square kilometers or 14
percent of Australia. It is an arid region where both rainfall and river flows are highly variable.
The Commonwealth of Australia (the national government) does not manage either intrastate
or interstate water uses or regulate water quality. Authority vests with the state governments,
which have sovereign powers over land, water, and natural resources. The water rights system
has been both established and maintained by the states. In addition, environmental protection
(including water quality) also falls within the sovereign powers of the states. For a detailed
discussion of the Murray-Darling River Basin Agreement, see DARLA HATrON MACDONALD
& MIKE YOUNG, A CASE STUDY OF THE MURRAY-DARLING BASIN: FINAL REPORT FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL WATERMANAGEMENT INSTr E 28-30 (rev. Feb. 2001), http://www.clw.csiro.
au/publications/consultancy/2001/MDB-IWMI.pdf; William A. Blomquist et al., Institutional
and Policy Analysis of River Basin Management: The Murray Darling River Basin, Australia 9-11
(World Bank Pol'y Res. Working Paper 3527, 2005), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstractid=673519; Jonathan L. Chenoweth & Hector M. Malano, Decision Making in
Multi-JurisdictionalRiver Basins - A Case Study of the Murray-DarlingBasin, 26 WATER INT'L 301
(2001); John Quiggin, Risk and Water Management in the Murray-DarlingBasin 14-15 (Univ. of
Queensland Schools of Econ. & Pol. Sci., Murray Darling Program Working Paper M05#4,
2005), http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/rsmg/WP/WPM05_4.pdf;JohnJ. Pigram & Warren
F. Musgrave, Sharing the Waters of the Murray-DarlingBasin: CooperativeFederalism Under Test
in Australia, in CONFLICT AND COOPERATION ON TRANS-BOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 131
(Richard E. Just & Sinaia Netanyahu eds., 1998) [hereinafter CONFLICT AND COOPERATION].
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represented on the Ministerial Council. Unanimous consent is required for
the establishment of policies by the Ministerial Council.
The prime functions of the Ministerial Council are
(a) generally to consider and determine major policy issues of
common interest to the Contracting Governments concerning
effective planning and management for the equitable efficient
and sustainable use of the water, land and other
environmental resources of the Murray-Darling Basin; (b) to
develop, consider and, where appropriate, to authorise
measures for the equitable, efficient and sustainable use of
such water, land and other environmental resources; (c) to
authorise works as provided for in [this Act]; (d) to agree
upon amendments to this Agreement including amendments
to or addition of Schedules to this Agreement as the
Ministerial Council considers desirable from time to time; (e)
to exercise such other functions as may be conferred on the
Council by this Agreement or any amendment or any Act
approving the same.26
The Ministerial Council acts through the MDB Commission, which
is also comprised of representatives of the different governments, as is the
counterpart Model Compact Council. Implementation of Ministerial
Council policies, however, is generally the responsibility of the states, as is
the case under the Model Compact. The Commission is an autonomous
organization equally responsible to the governments represented on the
Ministerial Council as well as to the Council itself. It has several key
functions, which include (1) advising the Ministerial Council in relation to
the planning, development, and management of the Basin's natural
resources; (2) assisting the Council in developing measures for the
equitable, efficient, and sustainable use of the Basin's natural resources; (3)
coordinating the implementation of or, where directed by Council,
implementing those measures; and (4) giving effect to any policy or decision
of the Ministerial Council.
The Model Compact is designed to vest ultimate authority in the
governors and other representatives of the signatory parties serving on the
Commission. However, rather than employing a common practice of
having the state administrators with water management responsibilities
serve as the governors' alternates on the administrative entity, the state
administrators serve a principal policymaking role in their own right on the
Council (Article IV.D). The Division (Article IV.E) elevates the role of

26. Murray-Darling Basin Agreement, 1992, pt. III, cl. 9, includedin Murray-Darling Basin
Act, 1993, Schedule (Austl.), available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au (search for "MurrayDarling Basin Act 1993").
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science in the compact structure from a largely staff responsibility to a
higher level of authority co-equal in its realm to the policy making role of
the Council. In essence, the Council and the Division make Commission
policy and decisions within their respective areas of responsibility and the
Commission only acts directly when it assumes jurisdiction over important
policy issues or such issues are brought before it via appeals from Council
or Division actions. This approach is similar to the federal judicial system
in which federal decisional law is made by the United States Courts of
Appeals unless the Supreme Court exercises its superior decisional
authority on a discretionary basis.
B. CommissionMembers
The Commission is comprised of the governors of the signatory
states (Article IV.B(1)(a)), a single Tribal representative if there are tribes in
the basin with adjudicated water rights (Article IV.B(1)(b)), and a federal
representative (Article IV.B(1)(c)). Indian tribes enjoy a special, judicially
recognized sovereign status and hold or claim substantial water rights
throughout the West. Consequently, it is both equitable and essential that
they collectively be represented in any compact governance institution in
a voting capacity by a representative of their choice.27 The Tribal representative would be selected by the tribe or tribes holding adjudicated water
rights or who are parties to water rights settlement agreements in the basin
covered by the Model Compact.28
The federal representative, who would be appointed by the
President after consultation with federal departments and independent
agencies having programmatic responsibilities in the Basin, should be a
person with recognized expertise in the allocation and management of
water resources. The role of the federal representative, which would include
coordination and representation of the views and interests of the
aforementioned federal departments and independent agencies, could be
further defined in terms of the needs of specific basins. With regard to
voting, for example, the federal representative could have no vote, full
voting status, limited voting status (i.e., only on matters directly affecting
a federal interest in the Basin waters), or a tie-breaker status.29

27. The Advisory Committee and the authors were advised by a Tribal member of the
Committee that such an arrangement has worked effectively in the Columbia River Basin.
28. An alternative, should the tribes be unable to agree on a single representative, could
be for the Secretary of the Interior to appoint the representative.
29. The federal representative is authorized to vote in several compacts. Delaware River
Basin Compact, art. 2, 75 Stat. 688,691 (1961); Susquehanna River Basin Compact, art. 2,84 Stat.
1509, 1512-13 (1970); Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, art. VIII, 63 Stat. 31 (1949). Other
compacts provide a third-party tie-breaking procedure when there is not agreement between
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C. General Powers of the Commission
During preparation of the Model Compact, in response to the
criticism that existing compacts typically do not grant sufficient authority
to a compact commission, 3° the Advisory Committee made it clear that the
Commission needed powers broad enough to accomplish the purposes of
the Compact.
Another dominant theme identified in the literature is the need for
interstate administrative entities like the Commission to have sufficient
discretion, authority, and flexibility to respond to changing conditions.
This is particularly true with regard to both drought and the impacts of
global climate change.32 The proposed powers contained in Article IV.B(3)

the two state parties to those compacts. Yellowstone River Compact, art. 111, 65 Stat. 663, 665-66
(1951); Klamath River Basin Compact, art. IX.A.10, 71 Stat. 497, 504 (1957); Snake River
Compact, art. VI, 64 Stat. 29, 31-32 (1950); Sabine River Compact, art. VII(j), 68 Stat. 690, 696
(1954), as amended, 76 Stat. 34 (1962), 106 Stat. 4600, 4662 (1992).
The political dimensions of alternative voting provisions are addressed in Zachary L.
McCormick, InterstateWaterAllocation Compacts in the Western United States - Some Suggestions,
30 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 385,390 (1994) [hereinafter McCormick, InterstateWater Allocation].
30. With regard to the authority of compact commissions, for example, Professor Davis
has noted that "compacts typically do not grant broad enough authority." Ray Jay Davis,
Guidelinesfor Interstate Water Compacts [hereinafter Davis, Guidelines] in INTEGRATED WATER
RESOURCES PLANNING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND ANNUAL CONFERENCE
189, 190 (Michael F. Domenica ed., 1995) [hereinafter INTEGRATED WATER RESOURCES
PLANNING] (citing Jerome C. Muys, Allocation and Management of InterstateWater Resources: The
Emergence of the Federal-InterstateCompact, 6 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 307 (1976)). Professor
Davis also notes that "[d]ispute resolution, enforcement powers, and sanctions also are not
now well articulated in many compacts." Id. at 190-91 (citing Richard A. Simms et al., Interstate
Compacts and EquitableApportionment, 34 ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 23-1 (1988)).
31. A summary of the literature regarding the need for flexibility in order to be able to
respond to changing conditions is contained in James Perry Hill, Managing the Nation's
Waters Without Washington: The Interstate Compact Experience 68-70 (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Michigan State University, 1992).
32. Both the Advisory Committee and numerous recognized experts have argued that any
type of "basin authority" responding to severe sustained drought must be authorized to study
water supply and demand issues, to develop basinwide water plans, and to facilitate water
transfers, including water marketing, and that all stakeholders need to be represented when
the "basin authority" exercises these powers. See, e.g., Lawrence J.MacDonnell et al., The Law
of the Colorado River: Coping with Severe Sustained Drought, 31 WATER RESOURCES BULL. 825
(1995). Likewise, it has been noted that institutional entities in such situations need broad,
flexible powers, especially with regard to water conservation, water use efficiency, reallocation
of existing supplies, and the use of market mechanisms. To achieve this, Kenney describes six
key characteristics of such institutional entities: (1) recognition of a wide variety of values and
interests with opportunities for stakeholder participation, (2) promotion of ecological integrity,
(3) consideration of a wide range of management options and strategies, (4) provision of timely
and accurate information, (5) implementation of decisionmaking mechanisms that facilitate
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fulfill these requirements as well as providing a comprehensive menu that
may be tailored to fit a compact's purposes.
A number of the enumerated powers are of particular note. For
example, Article IV.B(3)(k) authorizes the Commission to "[f]acilitate and
exercise approval authority with respect to voluntary interstate and
interbasin water transfers, water marketing and water banking." The use of
such mechanisms is an important means of more efficiently managing
available water supplies at the basin level that are not expressly available
under existing compacts.
Several commenters have observed that the ability to obtain expert
assistance is critical to the allocation and management of interstate water
resources. With regard to the Costilla Creek Compact, for example, one of
the members of the Advisory Committee has observed that the ability to
employ engineering assistance was necessary to properly administer the
Compact.33 Article IV.B(3)(d) authorizes the Commission to retain
"professional, technical, clerical and other staff and consultants" as needed.
Article IV.B(3)(f)(iv) authorizes the Commission to "[lievy and
collect taxes and special assessments."' Given that a principal purpose of
the Compact is to empower a regional entity to exercise or supplement
some of the powers traditionally exercised by basin states or the federal
government, there is no persuasive reason why regional beneficiaries
should not be subject to an equitable level of direct taxation to fund the
regional entity's operations. Similar language, however, does not appear to
be contained in any of the existing interstate water compacts.
The provisions of Article IV.B(3)(g) and (i) provide the authority
that the Commission would need to address the problem of interstate water
pollution. Article IV.B(3)(g) authorizes the Commission to develop and
implement the Water Quality Protection Program authorized under Article

public participation and provide clear outcomes, and (6) recognition of the regional character
of water resources. Kenney, Institutional Options, supra note 23, at 839. With regard to system
operations, the need for flexibility during periods of drought is illustrated in Julie E. Kiang &
Erik R. Hagen, Preparingfor Extreme Droughts: Moving Beyond the HistoricalPlanning Event,
Potomac Basin, in CRITICAL TRANSITIONS IN WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES
MANAGEMENT: PROCEEDINGS OFTHE WORLD WATER AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES CONGRESS
(Gerald Sehlke et al. eds., 2004) [hereinafter CRITICALTRANSmONS]. Accord Schilling, supranote

23, at 66.
33. See Kenneth W. Knox, The Costilla Creek Compact, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 453, 470
(2003) [hereinafter Knox, Costilla Creek Compact]. Accord Charles T. DuMars, Interjurisdictional
Compacts as Tools for Watershed Management (paper presented at the A.B.A. Section of Env't,
Energy & Resources 19th Ann. Water L. Conf., San Diego, Cal., 2001).
34. The language included in the Model Compact is adapted from the Ohio Revised Code.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6119.06(I), 6119.42 (LexisNexis 2003) (authority of regional water and
sewer districts).
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VI. Furthermore, Article IV.B(3)(i) authorizes the Commission to monitor
water quality pursuant to applicable Clean Water Act requirements.
Also of note are the provisions of Article IV.B(3)(1) regarding the
acquisition of property and the charging of fees for the use of such property.
The language contained in the Model Compact reflects the
recommendations of the Advisory Committee that the administrative entity
rely primarily on existing state powers but also have broader or alternative
powers to accomplish jointly what states cannot do individually. The latter
recommendation is also reflected in Article IV.B(3)(p) regarding
Commission participation with other governmental and non-governmental
entities.
There is general agreement that the first critical steps in the
allocation and management of any interstate water resource are the
of both a "common set of data" and appropriate models of the
development
35
resource.
[H]ydrology of the water resource is a place to start
consideration of sharing. Analysis of the water resource
includes the annual and seasonal flow in various reaches of
the stream and its tributaries, variation (flood and drought
potential), ground water availability, water contributions
from each jurisdiction, dependency of each entity on the
water resource, and availability of water from other sources.
In addition to the water resource, decision makers should
consider land resources (geographic conditions in each
jurisdiction), atmospheric resources, (weather and climate in
the river basin), and human resources - population, economic
needs and abilities, including capacity to develop the water
and alternative sources and to compensate for use, and
sociological considerations.3
The Commission would have ample authority to accomplish these tasks
under Article IV.B(3). One of the recommendations of the Advisory
Committee, that the Commission "needs to be oriented toward the future,
to have the capability of foresight," is reflected in Article IV.B(3)(o). Another
recommendation is followed in Article IV.B(3)(n), which provides authority
for the Commission to conduct and sponsor research.

35. See, e.g., DuMars, supra note 33, at 329. The "shared vision planning process"
(including use of the HEC-PRM optimization model and the STELLA simulation model) is
discussed in Hal Cardwell et al., CollaborativeModels for Planningin the MississippiHeadwaters,
in CRITICAL TRANsITIONs, supra note 32. The "shared vision planning process" and other
models are discussed in Schilling, supra note 23, at 66-67.
36. Ray Jay Davis, Principlesfor SharedUse of TransboundaryWater Resources, in INTEGRATED
WATER RESOURCES PLANNING, supra note 30 (citing LEONARD RICE & MICHAEL D. WHITE,
ENGINEERING ASPECTS OF WATER LAW ch. 5 (1987)).
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D. The Council
The Council is authorized to prepare and implement the Water
Quality Protection Program and Water Resources Management Program of
the Commission (Article IV.C(2)(a)) to determine the amount of water
available for supplemental apportionment as well as the terms, conditions,
and price for such apportionments (Article IV.C(2)(b)); to review proposed
water diversion, storage, or treatment projects (including water transfers,
marketing and banking) having significant interstate impacts (Article
IV.C(2)(c)); to enforce Commission programs and orders (Article
IV.C(2)(d)); to coordinate Commission actions with state and federal
agencies (Article IV.C(2)(e)); to address disputes referred to it by the
Commission (Article IV.C(2)(f)); and to recommend possible adjustments
to existing and proposed apportionments (Article IV.C(2)(g)). The Council
is also authorized to undertake any other duties assigned to it by the
Commission (Article IV.C(2)(h)).
E. The Division of Scientific Analysis
There was strong consensus on the Advisory Committee regarding
the importance of having a mechanism for developing and employing
generally accepted scientific data and analyses to balance the traditional
predominantly political focus of existing compacts. The composition of the
Division as well as the duties assigned the Division are intended to address
this requirement.3 7
Article IV.E establishes specific timelines for decisions by the
Commission, the Council, and the Division. This section was included
because of the oft-expressed frustration with the length of time needed for
governmental entities to make decisions. Article IV.E(1) also provides that
Commission decisions are final agency actions for the purposes of judicial
review.
Except as provided otherwise in the Compact, voting requirements
are to be determined by the Commission. Article IV.F(3) provides that" [t]he
Commission shall establish by unanimous decision the categories of

37. With regard to the general acceptance of scientific data and analyses, one mechanism
that the Division may wish to consider would be to apply the criteria enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-94 (1993):
(1) Has the theory or technique been tested? Can it be tested? (2) Has the theory or technique
been subject to peer review? (3) Does the theory or technique have an actual or potential high
error rate? (4) Are there standards controlling the operations of the technique? (5) Is the theory
or technique generally accepted within the relevant scientific community? See also Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149-50 (1999).
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Commission decisions requiring unanimous or lesser votes." Decisions of
the Council and Division (including enforcement decisions under Article
VIII) are to be by "majority vote of eligible voting representatives" (Article
IV.F(4)-(5)).
F. The Federal-Interstate Compact Option
As noted above, the primary role of the federal representative on
the Commission is to coordinate and represent the views and interests of
federal departments and independent agencies having programmatic
responsibilities in the basin. Such a role is of significant importance given
the number of federal statutes and regulations that affect interstate water
resources." In fact, a former Executive Director of the Delaware River Basin
Commission and member of the Advisory Committee, has concluded:
The lack of direct federal participation in interstate compacts
limits their usefulness .... Over the past thirty years, federal
laws have given the federal government large, new
responsibilities with substantial sums of money for many
activities, including pollution control, resource recovery,
clean-up of hazardous-waste sites, and protecting endangered
species. These new responsibilities and monies often make it
the controlling force in the success or failure of cooperative
state efforts to deal with interstate water problems through
interstate compacts. According to many experts, any plan for
an interstate river basin should not be considered comprehensive
without encompassingfederal waterplanningas an integral partof
the effort.39

38. One of the tasks undertaken as the Model Compact was being prepared was a case
study of the ongoing conflict between Alabama, Florida, and Georgia over the waters of the
Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa and the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River basins. One of the
major issues inhibiting the ability of the states to resolve their conflicts has been the
requirements of multiple federal statutes affecting interstate water resources. This case study
is summarized in George William Sherk, The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the
Twenty-First Century: Is It Time to Call Uncle?, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 764, 769-813 (2005). See also
Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles over Rivers: The Southeastern States and the Struggle
over the 'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 828,830,864-80 (2005).
39. Jeffrey P. Featherstone, Existing Interstate Compacts: The Law and the Lessons, 4 TOL. J.
GREAT LAKES' L., Sci. & POL'Y 271, 274 (2001) [hereinafter Featherstone, Existing Interstate
Compacts] (emphasis added) (citing Jerome C. Muys, Approaches and ConsiderationsforAllocation
of Interstate Waters, in WATER LAW: TRENDS, PoucIES AND PRACTCE 311,311 (Kathleen Marion
Carr & James D. Cramnond eds., 1995) and George William Sherk, Resolving InterstateWater
Conflicts in the Eastern United States: The Re-Emergence of the Federal-InterstateCompact,30 WATER
RESOURCES BULL. 397 (1994)). See also Richard A. Cairo, Dealing with Interstate Compact Issues:
The Federal-InterstateCompact Experience, in CoNFLICT AND COOPERATION, supra note 25, at 120,
122; McCormick, Interstate Water Allocation, supra note 29, at 393 (failure "to account for these
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To address this Gordian Knot, the Model Compact would permit
adaptation to reflect the views of the National Water Commission, contained
in Water Policiesforthe Future,recommending the federal-interstate compact
as the preferred institutional arrangement for water resources planning and
management in multistate regions. 4° The Model Compact could be relatively
easily converted into a federal-interstate water compact if (a) the United
States is made a signatory party; (b) the federal representative is made a
voting member of the Commission; and (c) the federal representative has
both the authority and the duty to bind federal agencies, to the extent of
their discretionary authority, to decisions of the Commission. The four most
recent compacts have included such provisions, which, if successful, could
have provided "the long-sought linkage between federal and state planning
and program implementation." 41 The effectiveness of any approach utilizing
a single federal representative has been questioned 42 but, unlike the
Delaware River Basin Compact, the Model Compact does not obligate a

federal claims in negotiating the allocation of water could result in a state being unable to use
its share of compact water"); Jeffrey P. Featherstone, Interstate Organizations for Water
Resources Management (paper presented at the 2001 Ann. Meeting of the Am. Pol. Sci. Ass'n,
San Francisco, Cal.) [hereinafter Featherstone, Interstate Organizations].
40. NAT'L WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTuRE 424 (1973) (Recommendation
No. 11-18). The Commission recommendation was based on an extensive study of interstate
water compacts. See JEROME C. MuYS, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS 388 (Legal Study 14 for the
Nat'l Water Comm'n, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Nat'l Technical Info. Serv. Rep. NWC-L-71-011,
1971) [hereinafter MUYS, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS]. For an excellent analysis of the 40year track record of the federal-interstate compact model, see Jeffrey P. Featherstone, An
Evaluation of Federal-Interstate Compacts as an Institutional Model for Inter-Governance
Coordination and Management of Water Resources for Interstate River Basins in the United
States (Aug. 1999) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University).
41. Jeffrey P. Featherstone, Water Resources Coordinationand Planningat the Federal Level:
The Need for Integration,WATER RESOURCES UPDATE, No. 104, Summer 1996, at 52, 54 (1996).
42. The founders of the DRBC [Delaware River Basin Commission] attached
considerable importance to the single federal agent as the coordinator of
federal action in the basin. This role did not materialize. The federal
representative has not been able to speak authoritatively for the federal
government. As noted by Derthick (1974) who performed research on the
DRBC and other interstate organizations in the early 1970s, the federal
member role evolved into more of an ambassador, reporting the various,
often conflicting positions of federal agencies without resolving them.
Derthick pointed out that the federal government has been a reluctant
partner in the compact commissions: "The dominant aim of the federal
agencies has been to avoid making commitments through the DRBC. The
federal member has been in an anomalous position. He is supposed to
represent the interests of the federal government that has never been
convinced its interests are being served by his being there."
Featherstone, Existing Interstate Compacts, supra note 39, at 281 (citing MARTHA DERTHICK &
GARY BOMBARDIER, BETWEEN STATE AND NATION: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED
STATES (1974)). Accord Featherstone, Interstate Organizations, supra note 39.
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single individual to represent the multiplicity of federal interests. The
approach embodied in the Model Compact provides for representation and
participation in Council and Division activities by a number of federal
agencies having water allocation and management responsibilities. It is the
authors' hope that this approach, when combined with a single federal
representative on the Commission, will be an effective means of facilitating
intergovernmental cooperation and agreement.
The federal-interstate compact approach was opposed by one
member of the Advisory Committee representing the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. This representative was firmly of the opinion that
Congress should in no way limit the discretionary authority of federal
agencies because any such limitation would "upset" both the expectations
of parties dealing with the agency (e.g., existing licensees and permittees)
and an asserted "balance" of authority over interstate water resources.
Article 11.1 of the Delaware River Basin Compact provides that
(a) The planning of all projects related to powers delegated to
the [Delaware River Basin] Commission by this compact shall
be undertaken in consultation with the Commission; (b) No
expenditure or commitment shall be made for or on account
of the construction, acquisition or operation of any project or
facility nor shall it be deemed authorized, unless it shall have
first been included by the Commission in the comprehensive
plan; (c) Each federal agency otherwise authorized by law to
plan, design, construct, operate or maintain any project or
facility in or for the basin shall continue to have, exercise and
discharge such authority except as specifically provided by
this section.43
Similar language is contained in Article 12 of the Susquehanna River Basin
Compact. 4
The language of Article 11.1 of the Delaware River Basin Compact
was clearly designed to require federal, state, and local water agencies to
conform their projects to the Commission's comprehensive plan. Since the
content of the comprehensive plan is determined by a majority vote of the
Delaware River Basin Commission, this meant that a state or the Federal
Government could be required to shape its projects to a plan with which it
was not in agreement. The federal agencies strongly objected to this and
persuaded Congress to add reservation(s) to the consent legislation,
providing in pertinent part that

43. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, pt. I, art. 11.1, 75 Stat. 688, 700-01
(1961).
44. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, art. 12.1,84 Stat. 1509, 1524-25
(1970).
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whenever a comprehensive plan, or any part or revision
thereof, has been adopted with the concurrence of the
member appointed by the President, the exercise of any
powers conferred by law on any officer, agency or
instrumentality of the United States with regard to water and
related land resources in the Delaware River Basin shall not
substantially conflict with any such portion of such comprehensive plan and the provisions of Section 3.8 and Article
11 of the Compact shall be applicable to the extent necessary
to avoid such substantial conflict.4'
Reservation(s) further provide(s) that the President may "suspend, modify
or delete" any provision of the comprehensive plan affecting federal
interests when he "shall find.. .that the national interest so requires." 46
A number of federal public land management and environmental
protection statutes contain similar "consistency" provisions.47 Many of these
statutory provisions, however, lack both certainty and predictability and

45. Delaware River Basin Compact, pt. H, art. 15.1(s)(1), 75 Stat. 688, 716 (one of a set of
reservations specified by article 15.1). Similar language was contained in the Alabama-CoosaTallapoosa River Basin Compact, art. VII, 111 Stat. 2233,2239-40 (1997), and the ApalachicolaChattahoochee-Flint River Basin Compact, art. X, 111 Stat. 2219,2225 (1997).
Delaware River Basin Compact reservations also provide that "concurrence by the
member appointed by the President shall be presumed unless within 60 days after notice to
him of adoption of the comprehensive plan, or any part or revision thereof, he shall file with
the Commission notice of his nonconcurrence." Delaware River Basin Compact, pt. II, art.
15.1(s)(2), 75 Stat. at 716. Similar language is contained in the Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River
Basin Compact, art. VII(a), 111 Stat. at 2237, and the Apaachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River
Basin Compact, art. VII(a), 111 Stat. at 2223.
46. Delaware River Basin Compact, art. 15.1(s)(1), 75 Stat. at 716.
47. See, e.g., Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-583, § 307,86 Stat. 1280,
1285 (codifed as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (2000)) (federal activities to be consistent
with state coastal zone management programs "to the maximum extent practicable"); Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, § 202, 90 Stat. 2743, 2748
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(9) (requiring coordination of federal land use and
management by the Secretary of the Interior with state and local governments "to the extent
consistent with the laws governing the administration of the public lands"). On the other hand,
the Safe Drinking Water Act is dh ct and leaves little room for unilateral federal agency
judgment:
Each department, agency, and instrumentality of the executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of the Federal Government having jurisdiction over any
potential source of contaminants identified by a State program.. shall be
subject to and comply with all requirements of the State program.. applicable
to such potential source of contaminants.. .in the same manner, and to the
same extent, as any other person is subject to such requirements, including
payment of reasonable charges and fees.
Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-339, § 205, § 1428(h), 100 Stat.
642, 662 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(h) (2000)).
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might easily be avoided unless the appropriate federal official is required
to issue a formal decision detailing any alleged impracticability,
inconsistency, or adverse effect of a proposed action on the national
interest.48

48. Regarding acceptance or rejection of state recommendations, see the Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act:
The Secretary shall accept recommendations of the Governor and may accept
recommendations of the executive of any affected local government if he
determines, after having provided the opportunity for consultation, that they
provide for a reasonable balance between the national interest and the wellbeing of the citizens of the affected State. For purposes of this subsection, a
determination of the national interest shall be based on the desirability of
obtaining oil and gas supplies in a balanced manner and on the findings,
purposes, and policies of this subchapter. The Secretary shall communicate
to the Governor, in writing, the reasons for his determination to accept or
reject such Governor's recommendations, or to implement any alternative
means identified in consultation with the Governor to provide for a
reasonable balance between the national interest and the well-being of the
citizens of the affected State.
Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, § 19(c), 92 Stat.
629, 653 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1345(c) (2000)).
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ARTICLE V
INTERSTATE WATER APPORTIONMENTS

A.

InterstateBase and Supplemental Apportionments
This Compact makes a present annual apportionment of quantities
of water to each signatory state from Basin waters within that state
considered adequate to (1) first maintain stream flows to fulfill the
requirements of applicable federal, state, and tribal laws and to
maintain a healthy and productive Basinwide ecosystem in
designated reaches of the system, in such amounts, and for such
- and (2) provide
seasons or duration as shown in Appendix
additional flows to satisfy the use requirements of all perfected
water rights derived from federal, state, or tribal law (base
apportionment). As depicted in the table below, the requirements
to satisfy these uses and certain non-consumptive uses, such as
hydroelectric power generation, have been converted to a
percentage of flows of the waters of the Utton River Basin. This
Compact further provides for future supplemental apportionment
by the Commission of reasonably predictable supplies in excess of
the base apportionment to each state on a percentage basis at a
reasonable price to be determined by the Commission, based
primarily on comparable transactions in the Basin.
Base Flow Apportionments
River X

State
A
B
C

Base
__ AF
__ AF
__ AF

A
B
C

__

Percentageof Flows
_
percent
_
percent
_
percent

River Y
__
__

AF
AF
AF

_
_
_

percent
percent
percent

The Basin's estimated safe annual yield of __ acre feet (AF) to
satisfy the base apportionments is based on an analysis of the
average annual and seasonal flows for the entire period of record,
the driest 10-year period of record, and the wettest 10-year period
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of record, taking into account existing surface and underground
storage facilities.
Entire period of record
Driest ten-year period
Wettest ten-year period

B.

C.

D.

__

AF
AF
AF

Consequently, the base apportionment of __
AF of flows is
determined to be reasonably secure, as is the availability of excess
water for further supplemental apportionments. If future
availability deviates substantially from these water supply
estimates so that the base or supplemental apportionments cannot
be satisfied, the Commission is authorized to make appropriate
equitable reductions of the perfected use rights portions of the
apportionments. The Commission shall also develop criteria for the
allocation of such shortages among the signatory states and specific
triggers for the implementation of such use curtailments. If
unanticipated impacts of federal environmental programs should
substantially, disproportionately, and adversely affect a state's
apportionment, the Commission shall allocate that burden pro rata
among all of the Basin states based on their respective shares of the
total Basin apportionments unless the states agree on another
formula.
IntrastateAllocations
Allocations of each state's apportionment to users or dedication to
maintenance of adequate flows shall be determined by each state
in accordance with applicable law. The Commission shall have no
permitting authority with respect to such allocations, but shall
provide assistance and advice if requested.
Adjustment to Base Apportionments
For a period of three (3) years from the effective date of this
Compact, or such longer period as the Commission may provide,
any signatory state may petition the Commission for an upward
adjustment of its base period apportionment to account for
perfected rights that were inadvertently not recognized for any
reason. The Commission shall not impose any charge for additional
water that may be added to a state's base apportionment.
Supplemental Apportionments
(1) No later than three (3) years after the effective date of this
Compact, the Commission shall determine the amount of
Basin water reasonably likely to be available above base
apportionments for supplemental apportionment on a
sustainable basis for the following five (5) years and shall
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make annual adjustments to the initial determination as new
hydrologic data and use levels may dictate.
(2) At the time of its initial determination, the Commission shall
announce the terms and conditions, including price, for
acquisition of supplemental apportionments and invite applications from each state for a portion or all of its percentage
entitlement to such water. Water for claimed rights that were
being diligently developed but were not perfected on the
effective date of this Compact may be afforded a priority
when the Commission considers applications for supplemental apportionments.
(3) The terms and conditions announced by the Commission
shall include as a condition to the receipt of any supplemental
apportionment the extent to which any party applying for
such an apportionment has been successful in conserving the
water resources of the Utton River Basin or is implementing
initiatives to achieve such conservation.
(4) Each supplemental state apportionment shall be for an initial
five (5) year period, subject to renewal for the same period (a)
on terms and conditions required by law at that time, (b) at a
price to be determined by the Commission based primarily on
transactions between willing sellers and buyers in the region,
and (c) at the same, reduced, or increased levels as the
estimates of available water supply, the states' records of
reasonable beneficial use, and the wishes of the states may
dictate. The Commission shall not charge for water for (a)
perfected rights that were inadvertently omitted from base
apportionments, (b) claimed rights that were not fully
perfected at the time of compact negotiation, and (c)
maintenance of adequate stream flows above levels in the
base apportionments.
Transfers of Apportionments
Signatory states may make such portion of their unused base
apportionments or any supplemental apportionments available to
other states or to the Commission for such periods, upon such
terms and conditions, and for such consideration, if any, as the
parties may negotiate unless the Commission after notice and
hearing disapproves the transfer after determining that it would
cause substantial injury to another signatory party.
Monitoring of Apportionment Usage
The Commission shall monitor water usage throughout the Basin
and enforce the Compact apportionments, giving credit for the use
of imported or developed water. It shall provide de minimis
exemptions for various kinds of uses, recognize a reasonable
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margin of error in measurement methodology, employ a system of
debits and credits for under- and over-uses or deliveries with
provision for a quantity limitation on such debits and requiring
overuse payback over a reasonable period, and establish similar
reasonable rules and procedures to monitor the apportionments in
an equitable and efficient fashion.
Measurement and Apportionment Chargeability of Subsurface Water
Usage
Within three (3) years of the effective date of this Compact, or such
longer period as the Commission may provide, each state shall
implement reasonably uniform systems for the estimation or actual
measurement of the extraction and consumptive use of subsurface
waters hydrologically connected to the Basin surface flows. After
that date, the consumptive use of such waters shall be charged to
each state's base or supplemental apportionment in amounts and
for appropriate time periods based upon Commission-approved
numeric models.
Apportionments Limited By Reasonable Beneficial Use
Within three (3) years of the effective date of this Compact,
(1)
the Commission shall complete an investigation of standards
and procedures applied by the signatory parties for
determining "reasonable beneficial use" for various uses
throughout the Basin. Within two (2) years thereafter, the
Commission shall recommend standards and procedures for
determining reasonable beneficial use for such uses, taking
into account different climatic and soil conditions, cropping
patterns, efficiency of conveyance facilities, adequacy of
measurement devices, per capita usage of comparable
domestic users, cultural requirements, and other relevant
considerations.
(2) To the maximum extent practicable, each state shall make
reasonable beneficial use of its apportionment pursuant to the
Commission recommendations and shall have primary
responsibility for enforcing such recommendations. Based
upon allegations by another signatory party that failure of a
state to make reasonable beneficial use of its apportionment
has caused substantial injury to the complaining party, the
Commission shall be authorized, after notice and hearing, to
(a) make an appropriate phased reduction in the state's base
and/or supplemental apportionment in an amount that the
Commission determines could have been conserved had the
recommended standards and procedures been implemented
and (b) make such water available for supplemental
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apportionment to the complaining and other signatory
parties.
The disposition of waters conserved by a signatory party or
users subject to its jurisdiction shall be controlled by
applicable law. The signatory state may provide that such
water may be transferred to other intrastate or interstate users
upon such terms and conditions, and for such consideration,
if any, as the parties may negotiate and the signatory party
approves. Interstate transfers or banking shall require
Commission approval. Within two (2) years of the effective
date of this Compact, the Commission shall promulgate
regulations governing the determination of the chargeability
of such transfers to the Compact apportionments of the
signatory states.
If the signatory party acquires such conserved water, it may
transfer its interest to the Commission for such purposes, and
upon such terms and conditions, and for such consideration
as the parties may negotiate, including but not limited to
supplemental apportionment to other states, maintenance of
adequate flows or other environmental values throughout the
Basin, or banking of such conserved water for future use by
the conserving state.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

ARTICLE V COMMENTARY
INTERSTATE WATER APPORTIONMENTS

A. The Apportionment Scheme
Article V rests on several basic premises. First is that adequate
stream flows should be maintained in each state in the Basin to provide a
healthy ecosystem, without which any long-term allocation and management agreement could be doomed to recurrent conflict or failure. Second is
that all existing rights in each state at the time of compact execution should
be protected to the extent they have been perfected under state or federal
law. These environmental stream flow and perfected rights requirements
would be established during compact negotiations from water use records
for administratively permitted or judicially adjudicated water rights and
other information to establish a "base apportionment" of enough water to
satisfy them. Water that the Commission later reasonably estimates would
be available in excess of the amount of the base apportionments would be
allotted periodically to the states as "supplemental apportionments."
(1) Apportionments Based on Estimated Safe Annual Yield
The water supply premise of the Model Compact is that the "safe
annual yield" of the Basin is more than adequate to satisfy the two
components of the base apportionment. The definition of "safe annual
yield" contained in Article III.K was developed by the authors based on a
review of a number of sources and definitions.49
The basis for the safe annual yield estimate would be set out in the
Compact with the further provision that if and when future availability
deviates "substantially" (perhaps defined in the compact or subsequent
regulation) from these water supply estimates so that the base
apportionments cannot be satisfied, the Commission is authorized to make
appropriate equitable reductions of the perfected use rights of the base
apportionments, most likely on a pro rata basis unless the Compact has
provided another formula. The reason for such specification of the original
water supply predictions is based on the experience under the Colorado
River Compact, which established apportionments and obligations based
on projections extrapolated from the best hydrologic data at the time, which
unfortunately have not materialized. Although there is little disagreement

49. See, e.g., UTAH Div. OF WATER REsouRcEs, UTAH'S WATER RESOURcES: PLANNING FOR
THE FUTURE 67 (2001), http://www.water.utah.gov/planning/SWP/SWP2001/SWP-pff.pdf
(defining "safe yield").
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as to the data the Compact negotiators relied on, it must be extracted from
the minutes of the negotiations and reports of the negotiators to their states
and Congress. Consequently, it seems desirable to perpetuate expressly in
any compact the actual data and projections that the negotiators relied on
so that there can be no disagreement if and when their expectations are not
realized and adjustments are deemed necessary.
(2) The Apportionment Methodology
The compact negotiators, having determined that enough water to
maintain adequate environmental flows and satisfaction of all perfected
rights in the Basin should be included in the base apportionments, have a
number of options for defining the base apportionments to each state.
Existing compacts reflect a number of different allocation approaches. One
review has found six general allocation methodologies: (1) the prior
appropriation doctrine, (2) specific quantities of water measured in terms
of beneficial consumptive use, (3) specific diversion rights measured in
fixed percentages of available flow, (4) the amount of actual storage
permitted in existing or future reservoirs, (5) outflow as a proportion of
actual inflow, and (6) combinations of the above.' Obviously, the unique
or special circumstances of a particular basin will dictate the appropriate
methodology. However, based on studies of various apportionment
methodologies and the recommendations of Advisory Committee members
and other knowledgeable commenters, the Model Compact quantifies the
base apportionments as percentages of flow volumes, primarily because of
the relative ease of measurement for monitoring purposes and the fact that
this approach appears to most equitably and effectively allocate the risk of
shortages between upstream and downstream states and minimize
incentives for non-compliance.5 '
With respect to supplemental apportionment of any water that the
Commission determines is available after satisfaction of the base
apportionments, again several methodologies are available for defining
each state's share. One approach would be for each state to receive a
percentage share of such surplus water based on its percentage share of the

50. Simms et al., supra note 30, at 23-8. See also Zachary L. McCormick, The Use of
Interstate Compacts to Resolve Transboundary Water Allocation Issues 471-78 (1984)
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Oklahoma State University); Douglas Kenney, Resolving
Interstate Water Allocation Conflicts: Tools, Strategies, and Administrative Options (paper
presented at the Ann. Conf. of the S. Reg. Info. Exchange Group, Nat. Resources Econ. Comm.,
May 18, 1995).
51. See Lynne Lewis Bennett, The Economics of Interstate River Compacts: Efficiency,
Compliance, and Climate Change (1994) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Colo.);
Lynne Lewis Bennett & Charles W. Howe, The Interstate River Compact: Incentives for Non
Compliance, 34 WATER RESOURCES RES. 485, 485-95 (1998).
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total base apportionments. Another might be to award each state an equal
percentage share on a principle of sovereign parity. A third could be to
authorize the Commission to make an administrative "equitable
apportionment" based on specific factors used by the Supreme Court or on
other reasonable factors set out in the compact, e.g., land areas in the basin,
water contribution to the total Basin resource, population, conservation
efforts, etc. Whatever method is chosen by the negotiators, the Model
Compact assumes that the states will negotiate their appropriate percentage
shares and include them in the compact. Each state's right to the resulting
percentage of entitlements would be subject to two principal conditions: (1)
implementation of a water conservation program and (2) payment for
certain classes of supplemental water at prices established by the
Commission based primarily on transactions between willing sellers and
buyers in the Basin.
B. Intrastate Allocations
The Model Compact makes it clear that the Commission shall have
no authority to issue individual permits or other entitlements to the waters
included within the base and supplemental apportionments to each state.
Such intrastate allocations to users or dedications to maintenance of
adequate flows shall be made or adjudicated by each state in accordance
with applicable law.
C. Base Apportionments
As to the first basic objective of the base apportionments, there is
little, if any, disagreement that a principal shortcoming of most state water
allocation systems, at least in the West under the prior appropriation system
until relatively recently, was the failure to provide for maintenance of an
adequate level of instream flows that would not be subject to diversion and
consumptive use for traditional beneficial purposes. 2Article V would make
such flows the first priority in the establishment of the base apportionments
under the Model Compact.
Protection and satisfaction of all existing perfected water rights is
the second priority and is designed to actually implement statements found
in almost all existing compacts declaring that all valid existing rights at the
time of its execution were to be satisfied, honored, or otherwise remain
unimpaired. It is not only designed to avoid having agreement on interstate

52. See, e.g., Stephen J. Shupe, Keeping the Waters Flowing:Stream Flow Protection Programs,
Strategiesand Issues in the West, in INsTREAM FLOW PROTECTION INTHE WEST ch. 1 (Lawrence J.
MacDonnell et al. eds., 1989).
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apportionments result in an unintended taking of existing rights, as in
Hinderliderv. La Plata & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 3 but should serve as an
inducement to water rights holders to support their state's participation in
the compact program. Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that in
applying the array of equitable factors to be considered in effecting an
"equitable apportionment," "so far as possible.. .established uses should
be
protected."' Defining "perfected" rights will be a critical challenge to the
compact negotiators. The definition in the Model Compact is based on the
5
Supreme Court's decision in Arizona v. California,"
but some argued in that
case that it meant more than actual maximum use under a claimed right
and should be measured by the capacity of constructed works.
A number of commenters suggested that the assumption that the
estimated "safe annual yield" will be adequate to take care of all perfected
rights in most basins may be too rosy and asked how base apportionments
will be made in basins that may already be overappropriated. The authors
believe that the compact negotiators should nevertheless proceed with
gathering the necessary information regarding perfected rights. If they
exceed the safe annual yield, a percentage share of the latter could be
apportioned to each state based upon its percentage share of the total
perfected rights, just as the Commission is authorized to do in times of
significant shortages in the safe annual yield upon which all base
apportionments are established. The Commission would also play an
important role in (1) establishing and enforcing reasonable beneficial use
standards throughout the Basin to make more water available through
conservation (Article V.H), (2) facilitating interstate water marketing to
move the available supply around more efficiently among willing sellers
and buyers (Article IV.B(3)(k)), and (3) promoting conjunctive use of
available storage reservoirs (Article VIII.C). Whatever approach is taken in
the overappropriated basins, it is essential to remember that the only
alternative would probably be interstate litigation in the Supreme Court,
which would be time-consuming, expensive, and unlikely to produce a
better result for all parties than the compact approach suggested above, or
surrendering their fate to the uncharted waters of congressional
intervention. 6

53.
54.
55.
56.

304 U.S. 92, 95-97 (1938).
Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945) (No. 6, Orig.).
373 U.S. 546, 566, 622 (1963) (No. 8, Orig.).
The words of Professor Charles Meyers may be prophetic:
Water resource development will increasingly involve river basin
management, and operations will transgress state lines and require large
federal expenditures. Such basin development plans must necessarily come
before Congress, and it is a highly appropriate time when they do so to settle
interstate conflicts over water allocation. Without such a settlement
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There was a relative paucity of data on existing rights and uses
when most of the existing water allocation compacts were negotiated. For
example, when the Colorado River Compact was negotiated in 1922 the
initial efforts to establish individual apportionments for the seven Basin
states based on estimates of irrigated and irrigable acreage were abandoned
after several months of negotiations because the states generally
exaggerated the essentially unknown extent of their existing and potential
development. Instead, based loosely on a concept of sovereign parity (a
50/50 split), the negotiators made an interbasin apportionment of beneficial
consumptive use of 7.5 million acre-feet (MAF) to the Upper Basin and 8.5
MAF to the Lower Basin on the assumption (which has turned out to be in
error) that there was enough water in the Basin to satisfy those uses and still
have a surplus of 4 or 5 MAF for later apportionment in 1963. 5'
Today there are much more reliable data on the extent of existing
rights and uses, as well as extensive hydrologic data. As to the former, there
have been much piecemeal water rights litigation and even more extensive
comprehensive stream adjudications since enactment of the McCarran
Amendment in 1952, primarily in the West."s But even in the mid-western
and eastern states, the advent of regulated riparianism has provided
administrative mechanisms to get a better handle on the present and
potential extent of riparian uses.5 9 Similarly, sophisticated aerial and
satellite photography has provided a means to ascertain the extent of past,
present, and potential irrigation, while the development of urban water
districts has provided substantial information on municipal and domestic
uses. Estimates of the current consumptive use requirements of all perfected
water rights throughout the basin and/or their associated diversion
requirements, including rights and uses by federal and Indian reservations
(not addressed in existing compacts), would be provided by the states, the
United States, and Indian tribes during compact negotiations and would be

development cannot go forward.
Charles Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 48 (1966). See also David H. Getches, The
Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the States'
Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 24 (2001) (noting that state influence over water policy has
declined to the point that the states "risk obsolescence" at the same time that both federal and
local influences over water policy have increased in importance).
57. See DANIEL TYLER, SILVER FOX OF THE ROCKIEs: DELPHUs E. CARPENTER AND WESTERN
WATER COMPACTS ch. 5 (2003).
58. See generally John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters: A Century ofAdjudicating
Rivers and Streams, Part11, 9 U. DENy. WATER L. REV. 299 (2006).
59. See A. DANIEL TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES, §§ 3:93-3:99 (2006).
See also George William Sherk, East Meets West: The Tale of Two Water Doctrines, 5 WATER
RESOURCES IMPACT No. 2, Mar. 2003, at 5, 5-8; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Issues Arising Under
RiparianRights: Replacing Common-Law Riparian Rights with Regulated Riparianism, in WATER
RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES 5 (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1998).
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based on adjudicated rights, claimed rights in pending adjudications, or,
where no adjudication is completed or pending, the best estimates of
present uses by appropriate officials based primarily on, but not limited to,
permitted appropriative or riparian uses, urban water use records, aerial
photos of irrigated agricultural lands, and records of subsurface water
pumping.
Quantifying unadjudicated Indian reserved water rights claims for
their reservations, which are generally quite large, will present a special
challenge to the Compact negotiators. If the full amount of such claims is
included in a state's base apportionment and a final adjudication or
settlement of those claims is lower, which seems likely, the state's base
apportionment will have been substantially overstated for some period of
time. If none of the claim is included until final adjudication or settlement,
the tribe might be deprived unfairly of any uses for an extended period. A
reasonable compromise might be to include in a state's base apportionment
an amount equal to the maximum amount of water historically put to use
by the tribe at the time of the compact's execution and the remainder of the
claim, when finally adjudicated or settled, included in a supplemental
apportionment by the Commission under Article V.D. The Model Compact
assumes that such a procedure will be adopted.
In a like vein, almost none of the negotiations of the existing
compacts assembled data on the flow requirements needed to maintain
healthy ecosystems and in most cases, apparently, the negotiators expressed
little, if any, concern about that issue. For example, the minutes of the
negotiations of the Colorado River Compact do not even mention the
subject, reflecting the water development culture of the time. Currently, on
the other hand, there are exhaustive data and many interested and capable
scientists eager to address the critical issue of the total amount of water that
should be dedicated to maintaining adequate stream flows throughout the
entire basin, recognizing that the timing and magnitude of required flows
will vary depending on both intra- and inter-seasonal variability and on
their purposes and location. Experience with the ACT-ACF (AlabamaCoosa-Tallapoosa and Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint) negotiations and
the releases from Glen Canyon Dam to meet the requirements of the
Colorado River Compact and the Colorado River Storage Project Act
suggest that this may not be an easy issue to address, so that a negotiated
rough approximation may be necessary. Consequently, the Model Compact
does not propose any particular methodology but simply stresses the
importance of using reliable data to determine adequate flows, the need for
monitoring such flows and providing authority to make necessary changes
when appropriate.
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D. Supplemental Apportionments
The second leg of the interstate apportionment system is the Commission's post-compact supplemental interstate apportionment of water
determined to be surplus to the amount required to satisfy the base
apportionments. The principal differences between the base apportionments and the supplemental apportionments is that the former are designed
to provide enough water to satisfy all existing perfected rights and
environmental flow requirements in each state at the time of Compact
negotiation, whatever they may be, whereas the latter would be negotiated
percentages establishing each state's share of predicted surplus flows to be
made available on a short-term, renewable basis subject to specific
conditions and at reasonable prices established by the Commission.
The authority proposed for the Commission to establish reasonable
prices for supplemental apportionments will undoubtedly be controversial,
but the authors believe that recognizing the economic value of water as a
market commodity, as long advocated by many economists, is a concept
whose time has finally arrived, just as has water marketing among users.
The Commission would only charge a state for previously uncommitted
water and not for water to satisfy (1) rights that may have inadvertently
been omitted from a state's claimed perfected rights at the time of compact
negotiation, (2) rights that were in the process of being perfected at that
time, and (3) water to be dedicated to the maintenance of adequate flows for
environmental purposes. It seems likely that most of the water coming with
a price tag would be for future domestic, municipal, and industrial needs,
including power generation. Presumably a state would pass those costs on
to such users as part of its water allocation procedures.
E. Transfers of Apportionments
The authors assume that if a state had no need for its full
supplemental apportionment entitlement it might nevertheless purchase the
apportionment and sell a percentage of it to a sister state that did need an
increase, at a modest markup. The agreement between Nevada and Arizona
where Nevada purchased some of Arizona's unused annual Secretarial
apportionment from Lake Mead for storage underground in Arizona until
such time as Nevada needs it may be a useful model.'
For the last dozen years or so, arguments have been exchanged by
Upper and Lower Basin lawyers in the Colorado River Basin as to whether

60. The evolution and components of the agreement between Nevada and Arizona are
detailed in James H. Davenport, Colorado River Interstate Water Banking, WATER REP. July 15,
2005, at 11.
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the Colorado River Compact, which is silent on interbasin transfers,
nevertheless impliedly prohibits them. The Model Compact is designed to
facilitate the mushrooming practice of water marketing by encouraging and
expressly permitting the states or their citizens (with their state's approval)
to enter into interstate marketing agreements for some of their base or
supplemental apportionments, subject to Commission review of such
proposals' impact on the other signatory parties and Commission
programs. A 2004 study of recent drought damages in the Rio Grande Basin
concluded that such damages could be substantially reduced in the future
through short-term interstate water marketing.6'
F. Subsurface Water Use and Chargeability
Most existing compact allocations do not clearly address, if at all,
the relationship between uses of surface water and hydrologically
connected subsurface water. This failure may subject the states to
chargeability of such subsurface uses to their surface water allocations (and
thereby possibly injure pumpers who may have relied on the state's
assurance that their pumping was lawful). In Kansas v. Colorado,62 the
Supreme Court held that the provision of the 1949 Arkansas River Compact
providing that "the waters of the Arkansas River [reaching Kansas at that
time].. .shall not be materially depleted in usable quantity or availability"

61. James F. Booker et al., Economic Impact of Alternative Policy Responses to Prolongedand
Severe Drought in the Rio Grande Basin, 41 WATER RESOURCES RES., W02026 (Feb. 2005).
Using an integrated hydrologic, economic and institutional model to examine
a range of alternative policy responses, we find some reductions in drought
damages result from policies such as intracompact market water transfers.
Larger reductions in drought damages are produced by interstate market
policies that reallocate scarce supplies to the highest-valued uses. However,
that kind of policy requires additional institutional flexibility to allow water
exchanges across state lines. There are rarely public policy changes that do
not involve costs, and any introduction of water marketing across state lines
will be subject to considerable debate and scrutiny.
Overall, compared to existing water allocation institutions, we find that
future drought damages could be reduced by 20% to 33% per year under the
most serious drought through intracompact and interstate water markets,
respectively, that would extend across current water management
jurisdictions.
For an overview of the "promise and prospects of water markets" and citations to some of the
best sources on the subject, see Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing,and Privatization,83
TEX. L. REV. 1873 (2005).
62. 514 U.S. 673 (1995) (No. 105, Orig.).
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was violated by post-compact increased pumping by Colorado from precompact wells.'
Similarly, in Kansas v. Nebraska," a dispute over the chargeability of
certain subsurface uses to Nebraska's allocation under the Republican River
Compact, Nebraska moved to dismiss Kansas's complaint on the grounds
that
(1) the Compact, by its plain and unambiguous terms, does
not apportion or allocate consumption of ground water; (2)
[the Supreme] Court and the Compact states have previously
interpreted the Compact as an agreement regarding rights to
surface water as distinguished from groundwater; and (3) the
parties did not intend to apportion groundwater under the
Compact.'
The Special Master rejected that argument and concluded that the
Compact's allocation of the "virgin water supply within the Republican
River Basin" included both the surface flows and the hydrologically
connected ground water and "restricts [Nebraska's] groundwater
consumption to whatever extent it depletes stream flow in the Republican
River Basin."' In denying Nebraska's motion to dismiss, the Supreme
Court agreed.67 The parties subsequently settled the case and promptly
adopted a sophisticated groundwater model to determine the amount,
location, and timing of streamflow depletions to the Republican River
caused by well pumping and to determine streamflow accretions from
recharge of water imported from the Platte River Basin.' A similar issue has
been raised by both Texas and New Mexico with respect to the chargeability
of pumping of subsurface waters by each state under the Rio Grande
Compact.
The Advisory Committee strongly advocated including use of
subsurface water hydrologically connected to surface water in compact

63. Id. at 690.
64. 538 U.S. 720 (2003) (No. 126, Orig.) (Decree).
65. Second Report of the Special Master at 20-21, Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (Apr.
15, 2003). See Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720 (approving Final Settlement Stipulation
accompanying Second Report). See also Republican River Compact, ch. 104, 57 Stat 86 (1943).
66. First Report of the Special Master at 1-3, Kansas v. Nebraska, 528 U.S. 1151 (Feb. 28,
2000) (No. 126, Orig.).
67. Kansas v. Nebraska, 530 U.S. 1272 (2000) (No. 126, Orig.).
68. Kansas v. Nebraska, 538 U.S. 720. The model is set forth in the Final Report of the
Special Master, Kansas v. Nebraska, 540 U.S. 964 (Oct. 20, 2003) (No. 126, Orig.). For a
discussion of the legal and technical issues involved in the Republican River Compact
controversy, see Kenneth W. Knox, The Allocation of Interstate Ground Water: Evaluation of
the Republican River Compact as a Case Study (2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Colorado State University).
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apportionments. Consequently, the Model Compact provides a three-year
period for the states to adopt reasonably uniform systems to measure such
subsequent uses, perhaps modeled after that used in the Republican River
Compact litigation, after which they would be charged against a state's
apportionments. Some commenters suggested that three years might not be
a long enough lead time.
G. Reasonable Beneficial Use
Section 8 of the Reclamation Act of 1902 provides that "beneficial
use shall be the basis, measure and limit" of any water rights acquired
under that Act.69 Most western states have similar language in their
constitutions or statutes, as well as statutory prohibitions against the
"waste" of water, i.e., the amount of water applied to particular beneficial
uses must be "reasonable." These two concepts have merged into
"reasonable beneficial use" as the dominant guiding principle of western
water use, i.e., water rights attach to only the amount of water reasonably
applied to a beneficial use, either consumptive or non-consumptive.
Although beneficial uses generally span a broad consensus-based spectrum,
application of the reasonableness standard of water application to such uses
is neither relatively uniform nor aggressively enforced. One of the Advisory
Committee members said bluntly that "no state has had the courage to set
meaningful standards for reasonable beneficial use." Whether that is true
or not, the authors are convinced that the principal long-term source of
"new" water for expanding populations and environmental values will
come from increased conservation efforts. A major component of this effort
must necessarily be more aggressive enforcement of a clearly defined
reasonable beneficial use standard.
The Supreme Court has already applied this concept in its interstate
equitable apportionment decisions. In Wyoming v. Colorado,"' the Court
applied "reasonable use" as an important criterion, stating that "the
doctrine [of prior appropriation applied in each state and used as the basis
for the Court's decision] lays on each of these states a duty to exercise her
right [in the Laramie River] reasonably and in a manner calculated to conserve
the common supply."7' The expansive list of equitable considerations later set
forth in Nebraskav. Wyoming 2 included "the practical effect of wasteful uses
on downstream areas."7" "Wasteful uses" were later given careful attention

69. Reclamation (National Irrigation or Newlands) Act, ch. 1093, § 8, 32 Stat. 388, 390
(1902) (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 372 (2000)).
70. 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (No. 3, Orig.).
71. Id. at 484 (emphasis added).
72. 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (No. 6, Orig.).
73. Id. at 618.
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in Coloradov. New Mexico.74 In the first round of the Vermejo River dispute,
the Court relied on Wyoming v. Colorado'h in making it clear that the
availability of "reasonable conservation measures" to reduce both
Colorado's proposed upstream diversion and New Mexico's existing uses
was an important consideration and that the states had "an affirmative duty
to take reasonable steps to conserve and augment the water supply of an
interstate stream."7 6 The Court remanded the case to the Special Master for
more specific findings on the conservation issues, but on review of those
findings the Court later concluded that Colorado had not established by the
requisite "clear and convincing evidence" that its proposed diversion
should be permitted.'
Contemporaneously with its Vermejo decisions, the Court held in
Idaho v. Oregon & Washington78 that the doctrine of equitable apportionment
applied in its interstate water cases was equally applicable to a dispute
among the three states over their respective shares of the anadromous fish
in the Columbia-Snake River system. The basic principle it applied was that
"states have an affirmative duty under the doctrine of equitable
apportionment to take reasonable steps to conserve and even to augment the
natural resources within their borders for the benefit of other states."'9 This
awesome pronouncement of state responsibilities in using shared regional
resources was not further refined because the Court concluded that Idaho
had not proved a present injury and dismissed its complaint.
Considering that the "reasonable beneficial use" principle is
applicable intrastate under both state and federal law and has been used
repeatedly by the Supreme Court as an important factor of federal common
law in its interstate equitable apportionment decisions, it seems entirely
appropriate, if not mandatory, for an interstate compact commission
implementing a negotiated equitable apportionment to clarify and
strengthen application of the concept on a regional basis.
The approach proposed in the Model Compact is for the
Commission to first review the application of the principle in the signatory
states and then recommend (not impose) standards and procedures for
determining reasonable beneficial use through the region. It is not intended
to be a "one-size fits all" standard. Rather, the Commission is directed to
recognize differences in the accepted components of the standard
throughout the Basin where appropriate. The states would continue to have

74.

459 U.S. 176 (Vermejo 1) (1982) (No. 80, Orig.); 467 U.S. 310 (Vermejo II) (1984) (No. 80,

Orig.).
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (No. 3, Orig.).
Vermejo 1, 459 U.S. at 185, 187.
Vermejo II, 467 U.S. at 316-20.
462 U.S. 1017 (1983) (No. 67, Orig.).
Id. at 1025 (emphasis added).
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primary responsibility to enforce the recommended standards. However,
upon complaint of another signatory party that failure of a Basin state to
enforce the standard was causing it substantial injury by depriving it of
water, the Commission, after notice and hearing, would be authorized to
gradually reduce the wasting state's apportionment by the amount of water
that could reasonably have been conserved by enforcement of the
recommended guidelines and reapportion it to the complaining party and
other states or parties.
This proposal will undoubtedly be controversial. Some state
spokespersons have already complained, and others undoubtedly will,
about this "intrusion" by the Commission into a highly sensitive area.
However, the proposal is only for recommended guidelines and continuation
of state enforcement of them until such time as a neighboring state
complains and demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence as required
in Vermejo, that lack of enforcement is causing it substantial injury. The
alternative, absent the compact, would be for the complaining state or states
to bring an equitable apportionment action in the Supreme Court, based on
the precedents cited above, alleging wasteful water use practices by the
non-enforcing state or states that are causing it injury and seeking
enforcement of the reasonable beneficial use standard. In short, it boils
down to a choice by a non-enforcing state as to whether it wants to comply
with the standards and enforcement authority of a commission comprised
of the principal water management officials of its sister Basin states (all
subject to the same standard) or the predilections and limited knowledge
in this field of nine Supreme Court justices in Washington, D.C. and all that
would cost. The choice seems clear to the authors, who hope it will be
equally clear to the states in interstate river basins.
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ARTICLE VI
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION PROGRAM
A.

Policy and Standards
(1) The Commission may (a) establish and enforce water quality
standards and wasteload allocations and (b) enforce National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits
under the Clean Water Act for the interstate components of
the Utton River Basin. The signatory states and Indian tribes
shall exercise corresponding authority on the intrastate
tributaries to such interstate streams.
(2) The Commission may assume jurisdiction to abate existing
pollution in the interstate waters of the Basin and control or
prevent future pollution whenever it determines, after
investigation, notice and hearing, and consultation with the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), that pollution by
sewage or industrial or other waste or excessive salinity
originating within or flowing through or along a signatory
state or Indian reservation threatens to injuriously affect
interstate waters of the Basin. Upon such determination, the
Commission may classify the interstate waters of the Basin
and establish (a) reasonable chemical, physical, and biological
guidelines for water quality for various uses and (b)
standards of treatment of sewage, industrial, or other waste
for such classes, including allowance for the variable factors
of surface and subsurface waters, such as size of the stream or
aquifer flow, movement, location, character, self-purification,
and usage of the waters affected, and may adopt rules,
regulations, and standards to abate existing pollution and
prevent or control such future pollution, and to require such
treatment of sewage, industrial, or other waste or alteration
of certain land use practices within a reasonable time.
(3) The Commission may establish a mechanism for the transfer
of pollution allowances, including NPDES permits, consistent
with the requirements of the Clean Water Act.
(4) With respect to alleged violations of the Clean Water Act, the
Commission may, after prompt investigation, notice, and
hearing, order any person or public or private corporation or
other entity to cease the discharge of sewage, industrial, or
other waste into waters of the Basin or alter such irrigation or
other land use practices that it determines to be in violation
of its rules and regulations applicable to the Basin's interstate
waters. Any such order may prescribe a reasonable date for
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the construction of any necessary works or undertaking or
discontinuance of any practice, on or before which such
discharge or practice shall be wholly or partially discontinued, modified, or otherwise conformed to the requirements
of such rules and regulations. Such an order shall be reviewable in any court of competent jurisdiction. The Commission
may (a) invoke as complainant the power and jurisdiction of
water quality control agencies or courts of the signatory
parties or (b) bring an action in its own right in any court of
competent jurisdiction to compel compliance with any
provision of this article, or any rule, regulation, or order
issued pursuant thereto; provided that the Commission shall
first refer the matter to the appropriate state environmental
protection agency or the EPA Regional Director, as
appropriate, and request that enforcement action be taken.
Failure of the state environmental protection agency or the
EPA to initiate enforcement action within 30 days shall
authorize the Commission to take appropriate enforcement
action.
Tributary Waters
(1) The Commission may recommend to the signatory parties
reasonable chemical, physical, and biological guidelines for
water quality satisfactory for various uses of tributary waters
consistent with the requirements of the Clean Water Act. Each
signatory party shall classify or reclassify the intrastate
tributary waters and submit the classification or
reclassification to the Commission for its review and
recommendation. The Commission may propose such
changes in its recommended classifications and standards as
may be required by changed conditions, the desirability of
uniformity, or to meet the primary purposes of this Compact
and the Clean Water Act.
(2) Consistent with the requirements of the Clean Water Act,
each of the signatory parties shall prohibit or control
pollution of the intrastate tributary waters of the Basin to the
extent necessary to maintain the quality of such waters to a
degree at least equal to the requirements of the interstate
stream immediately above the confluence of such streams.
(3) Nothing in this Compact is intended or shall be construed to
repeal, modify, or qualify the authority of any signatory party
to enact any legislation or issue administrative rules or
enforce any additional conditions and restrictions to reduce
or prevent the pollution of intrastate tributary waters within
its jurisdiction.
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ARTICLE VI COMMENTARY
WATER QUALITY PROTECTION PROGRAM
The Advisory Committee and many commenters have recognized
that "water quality requirements also raise transboundary issues, and a
truly comprehensive compact would address those issues as well."8" Prior
to enactment of the Clean Water Act,8 1 "federal courts resolved interstate
pollution conflicts under the federal common law of nuisance, which
generally allowed the courts to balance competing interests and fashion a
fair and equitable solution to the interstate conflict." 82 Following enactment
of the Clean Water Act, however, little room remained for common law
remedies. 3 In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois,' the Supreme Court concluded
that the Clean Water Act preempted the common law remedies that had
been applicable to interstate water pollution conflicts.8 "

80. McCormick, InterstateWater Allocation, supranote 29, at 392. Professor Davis reached
a similar conclusion: "Not only compacts motivated by quality concerns, but also those in
which allocation affects quality should address water quality." Davis, Guidelines,supra note 30
(citing C. Williams, Interstate Water Compact for the Potomac River Basin (1994) (unpublished
student thesis, on file with the J. Reuben Clark Law Library, Provo, Utah).
81. Federal Water Pollution Control (Clean Water) Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948)
(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000)).
82. Mary A. Stilts, Note, The Ever-ChangingBalance of Power in Interstate Water Pollution:
Do Affected States Have Anything to Say After Arkansas v. Oklahoma?, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1341,1342 (1993) (citations omitted). See also Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary
Pollution, 46 DUKE L.J. 931, 940-54 (1997); Alan M. Fisch, Note, Arkansas v. Oklahoma:
FormalizingEPA Authority to MandateCompliance with an Affected State's WaterQuality Standards,
6 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 439, 443-44 (1993); William J. Holmes, Note, The Impact of Arkansas v.
Oklahoma on the NPDES Process Under the Clean Water Act, 23 ENVTL. L. 273, 275-81 (1993).
83. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-18
(1981) (holding that Congress had not created an implied right of action for damages under the
Clean Water Act).
84. 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
85. Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481,492 (1987) (the Clean Water Act preempted
actions brought under the common law of nuisance). Professor Percival notes that the majority
decision in In ternationalPaperconcedes
that the Clean Water Act does not directly address the question of
preemption of state common law. After reviewing the goals and policies of
the Clean Water Act, [Justice] Powell [writing for the majority] concluded
that allowing affected states to impose their own separate discharge
standards on source states inevitably would create a serious interference with
achievement of the full purposes of Congress. Holding a discharger in
another state liable for violating more stringent requirements of state
nuisance law in the receiving state would compel the sourceto adopt different
control standards than those approved by the EPA and its home state. The
inevitable result would be to allow states to "do indirectly what they could
not do directly - regulate the conduct of out-of-state sources." This would
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The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments8 6 (later to
become known as the Clean Water Act) were enacted in 1972 after all of the
water pollution control compacts and all but two of the 26 existing water
allocation compacts had been negotiated by the states and consented to by
Congress. The Clean Water Act was designed to facilitate the restoration
and maintenance of the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the
waters of the United States. One of the mechanisms utilized to achieve these
goals was the imposition of regulatory requirements. In essence, discharges
into the waters of the United States are unlawful unless a National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit for such discharges has been
issued prior to the discharge. With regard to interstate water pollution, the
Supreme Court has concluded that the Environmental Protection Agency
is authorized to impose conditions on the issuance of an NPDES permit in
an upstream state requiring the discharger to comply with a downstream
state's water quality requirements.87 The Court's holding that the

undermine the predictability and efficiency of the Clean Water Act's permit
scheme and could subject a source to a variety of "vague" and
"indeterminate" common law rules adopted by downstream states.
Robert V. Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of Interstate
Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717, 767 (2004) (citations omitted).
86. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500,86 Stat.
816 (codified in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.).
87. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992). At issue in Arkansas v. Oklahoma was EPA
authority to impose conditions on a Fayetteville, Arkansas, NPDES permit (upstream) as
needed to prevent violation of Oklahoma's water quality standards (downstream):
Even if the Clean Water Act itself does not require the Fayetteville discharge
to comply with Oklahoma's water quality standards, the statute clearly does
not limit the EPA's authority to mandate such compliance.
Since 1973, EPA regulations have provided that an NPDES permit shall
not be issued "[wihen the imposition of conditions cannot ensure compliance
with the applicable water quality requirements of all affected States." 40 CFR
§ 122.4(d) (1991); see also 38 Fed. Reg. 13533 (1973); 40 CFR § 122.44(d) (1991).
Those regulations - relied upon by the EPA in the issuance of the Fayetteville
permit -constitute a reasonable exercise of the Agency's statutory authority.
Congress has vested in the Administrator broad discretion to establish
conditions for NPDES permits. Section 402(a) (2) provides that for EPA-issued
permits "[t]he Administrator shall prescribe conditions.. .to assure
compliance with the requirements of [§ 402(a)(1)] and such other requirements
as he deems appropriate." 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(2) (emphasis added). Similarly,
Congress preserved for the Administrator broad authority to oversee state
permit programs:
"No permit shall issue.. if the Administrator objects in writing to the
issuance of such permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of
this chapter." § 1342(d)(2).
The regulations relied on by the EPA were a perfectly reasonable exercise
of the Agency's statutory discretion.
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"application of state water quality standards in the interstate context is
wholly consistent with the Act's broad purpose 'to restore and maintain the
'
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters'
reinforces the authority of Congress reflected in Article VI.A(1) of the
Model Compact to authorize the Commission both to adopt water quality
standards and to issue NPDES permits for the interstate portion of the river
basin. Article VI.A(1) also provides that "signatory states and Indian tribes
shall exercise corresponding authority on the intrastate tributaries to such
interstate streams."
Under the Clean Water Act, implementation and enforcement of the
Act's requirements may be delegated by EPA to the states. The language of
Article VI regarding the Model Compact's Water Quality Protection
Program is intended to be used in situations where (a) one or more of the
signatory parties to the compact either do not have authority to implement
and enforce the requirements of the Clean Water Act or have failed to do so
adequately or (b) the signatory parties collectively agree to delegate their
Clean Water Act authority to the Commission. In such situations, the
Commission is authorized under Article VI.A(2) to assume jurisdiction and
to classify the interstate waters of the river basin, to establish water quality
guidelines and standards, and to promulgate rules and regulations as
needed to fulfill the requirements of the Clean Water Act. In essence, the
Commission rather than EPA would have the authority to determine
whether an upstream state is in compliance with the Clean Water Act. As
noted by one commentator:
Contrary to the conclusion of many commentators, the
Supreme Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma intended the Chevron
doctrine to govern only the relationship between the courts
and the EPA in interstate water disputes. The ruling was not
intended to subordinate the states to the EPA in the same way

503 U.S. at 105 (footnote omitted) (edits in original). Reviewing this decision, Professor Percival
concluded:
This decision, which was founded largely on Chevron deference to the EPA's
exercise of discretion under the Clean Water Act, provides a potential avenue
for downstream states with more stringent environmental standards to
mitigate the impact of Ouellette's exclusive focus on the law of source states.
The Court in Arkansas v. Oklahoma interpreted Ouellette not as a bar on
considerationof the impacts of transboundarypollution on downstream states, but
ratheras a limit on the remedies available to downstream states.
Percival, supra note 85, at 72 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). The reference to "Chevron
deference" is to Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
which addressed the scope of agency authority to interpret a statute and noted the
circumstances under which a reviewing court should defer to the agency interpretation.
88. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. at 106 (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).
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as the preemption analysis of past water pollution decisions
did.8 9
Under Article VI.A(3), the Commission is also authorized to
"establish a mechanism for the transfer of pollution allowances, including
NPDES permits, consistent with the requirements of the Clean Water Act."
This language is based on a mechanism contained in the Murray-Darling
Basin Agreement allowing the transfer of salinity credits. Such a
mechanism, particularly if it included declining discharge offsets or nonpoint sources of water pollution that do not require NPDES permits (or
both), could facilitate the achievement of Total Maximum Daily Load
(TMDL) goals required by section 303(d) of the Clean Water Act.'
Article VI.B(1) authorizes the Commission to recommend chemical,
physical, and biological guidelines for tributary waters as needed to fulfill
the requirements of the Clean Water Act. In response, the signatory parties
are required to "classify or reclassify the intrastate tributary waters and
submit the classification or reclassification to the Commission for its review
and recommendation." The Commission may then recommend changes to
the classifications as needed to achieve the goals of the Clean Water Act.
Article VI.B(2) requires the signatory parties to "prohibit or control
pollution of the intrastate tributary waters of the Basin to the extent
necessary to maintain the quality of such waters to a degree at least equal
to the requirements of the interstate stream immediately above the
confluence of such streams." This language is intended to facilitate the
restoration and maintenance of water quality in both intrastate and
interstate streams. In essence, the signatory parties would not be able to
avoid the maintenance and restoration of an intrastate stream by blending
those waters with the waters of an interstate stream. This language does not
preclude the signatory parties from enacting more stringent requirements
as needed to protect and maintain the signatory parties' water resources
(Article VI.B(3)).
As noted by one member of the Advisory Committee, "virtually
every western state has received delegation to administer Clean Water Act
programs, including establishing water quality standards and issuing

89.

Katheryn Kim Frierson, Comment, Arkansas v. Oklahoma: Restoring the Notion of

PartnershipUnder the Clean Water Act, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 459, 470.
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000). A TMDL is a tool for implementing water quality standards
and is based on the relationship between pollution sources and in-stream water quality
conditions. The TMDL establishes the allowable loadings or other quantifiable parameters for
a waterbody and thereby provides the basis to establish water-quality-based controls. These
controls should provide the pollution reduction necessary for a waterbody to meet water
quality standards. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Total Maximum Daily Load, Overview of
Program and Regulations,
Current Total Maxium Daily Load -TMDLhttp://www.epa.gov/owow/tmdl/overviewfs.html.
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NPDES permits." The provisions of Article VI are not intended to usurp
that authority but rather to coordinate effective implementation of the
Clean Water Act among the signatory parties and to provide broad
enforcement authority under Article VI.A(4) supplemental to that exercised
by the states and the EPA.91

91. Failure to comply with the requirements of the Clean Water Act may result in both
civil and criminal sanctions. 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (2000). Citizen suits to enforce Clean Water Act
requirements are also authorized. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (2000).
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ARTICLE VII
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

A.

Water Supply and Requirements
(1)

(2)

(3)

Within two (2) years of the effective date of this Compact, the
signatory parties shall submit to the Commission (a) their
respective estimated water requirements for specific projects
or categories of uses, including adequate stream flows, for the
next five (5) years; (b) the assumptions underlying such
estimates, including population projections; and (c) the
estimated water supply available to meet such needs
identified as to the sources of such supply, whether from
surface flows, subsurface waters hydrologically connected to
surface flows, non-tributary subsurface waters, imported
waters, or developed waters.
Each state shall also provide the Commission with its plans to
supplement such supplies, e.g., construction of new storage,
diversion, desalination, watershed restoration, recycling/
reuse, or wastewater treatment projects; expansion of existing
projects; increased conservation; intrastate, interstate, or
interbasin transfers; or other actions, along with the timing,
location, increased yield, estimated cost, and impact on water
quality of each component.
Based upon such submittals, the Commission shall develop
a basinwide water resources management program
establishing construction or implementation priorities for the
components of the states' proposed programs and possible
alternatives to certain components. The Commission shall
encourage and support initiatives by local entities, such as
informal watershed councils, and shall defer to such
initiatives unless such deference would result in significant
demonstrable adverse impacts on interstate waters. The
Commission shall review the program at least every five (5)
years and revise it as appropriate. If the Commission
determines that anticipated demand appears reasonably
likely to exceed the expected supply in the next five-year (5)
cycle, it may direct the signatory parties to suspend
authorization of any new uses until the supply and demand
estimates are brought into reasonable balance.
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Commission Review and Approval of Projects
Proposed substantial new water resource development projects,
major new surface diversions or subsurface water extractions,
interstate transfers and related operational guidelines shall be
subject to review and approval by the Commission and shall be
approved if in conformity with the Commission's water resources
management program or with reasonable modifications to establish
such conformity.
Conjunctive Use
(1) The Commission shall study and encourage the conjunctive
use of both natural and artificial water storage facilities and
subsurface aquifers for the storage and management of Basin
waters without regard to the ownership or location of such
facilities. It shall develop plans for their most locationally,
economically, and environmentally efficient utilization,
including interstate water banking and adequate stream flow
maintenance, in cooperation with and with the consent of
their owners and the states where they are located upon
reasonable terms and conditions. The Commission shall
develop an accounting methodology to equitably charge the
benefits of such conjunctive use to the apportionment of
particular states or to the Basin as a whole and not solely to
the storing state. Additional reservoir evaporation, stream
flow, or aquifer losses attributable to particular arrangements
shall be equitably charged to identifiable beneficiary states or
the Basin as a whole, as appropriate.
(2) Where proposed conjunctive use of a federal, state, or tribal
owned reservoir would conflict significantly with an
authorized purpose of such reservoir that cannot be resolved
by agreement, the federal, state, or tribal operating agency
shall seek legislative modification of such authorization to
accommodate, if possible, the conflicting uses.
Flood Control
(1) Flood Control Facilities
The Commission may construct and operate projects and
facilities deemed necessary or desirable for flood damage
prevention or reduction. It shall store and release waters
within the Basin, in such manner, at such times, and under
such regulations developed in consultation with the United
States Army Corps of Engineers, as it deems appropriate to
meet various flood conditions.
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Flood Plain Zoning
(a) The Commission may determine the extent of the flood
plains in the Basin and may establish, pursuant to its
rulemaking authority under Article JV.B(3)(a), encroachment lines and delineate the areas subject to flood,
including a classification of lands with reference to
relative risk of flood and the establishment of standards
for flood plain use that will safeguard the public health,
safety, and property. The Commission may enter into
agreements to provide technical and financial aid to any
signatory party or its political subdivisions for the
administration and enforcement of any ordinances or
regulations implementing such standards.
(b) The Commission may establish standards governing the
uses of land in areas subject to flooding by waters in the
Basin. Such standards shall not restrict the power of the
signatory parties or their political subdivisions to adopt
more restrictive standards.
(c) The Commission may acquire any interest in lands and
improvements thereon within an established flood plain
for the purpose of restricting the use of such property so
as to minimize flood hazards and to implement its flood
plain restrictions.
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ARTICLE VII COMMENTARY
WATER RESOURCES MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

A. Coordinationof Regional Supply and Demand Planning
This aspect of the Commission's authority and responsibility
assumes that all party states are engaged in varying degrees in assessing
their water requirements over specific periods and the water supply likely
to be available to satisfy them. What is not clear is whether and to what
extent the programs of the individual states in an interstate river basin are
coordinated with those of the other states, Indian tribes, and the federal
agencies in the basin. Given the history of regional water resources
planning, the authors operated on the realistic assumption that there is
little, and not very effective, interstate coordination of development plans.
Further, it is reasonable to assume that the lack of such coordination
necessarily results in less than optimum siting, timing, scope, and character
of various projects and programs for developing and utilizing additional
supplies for various purposes throughout the Basin.
With that background, the role proposed for the Commission is a
relatively modest one (although it could be expanded if states should
choose to). It would review the Basin states' planning programs from a
regional perspective, making recommendations for adjustments in these
programs to better serve the interests of the entire Basin in its shared
resources as efficiently and cost-effectively as possible. It would also
exercise a review and approval authority to assure that new projects and
programs with significant interstate impacts throughout the Basin are in
general conformity with the coordinated state programs (Article VII.B). The
Commission is expressly directed to defer to the growing movement
toward local, small watershed programs as long as they have no significant
interstate impacts.92
This approach is far different from those situations where a river
basin commission takes the lead in developing a "comprehensive plan" for
the basin that is then binding upon all of the basin states, such as under the
Delaware and Susquehanna River basin compacts. Although the
circumstances in those two basins 45 years ago may have been unique
because of the absence of any significant water planning by the basin states
at that time, other than New York, the authors agree with the Advisory

92. See generally DOUGLAS KENNEY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AT THE WATERSHED LEVEL
(Rep. to the W. Water Pol'y Rev. Advisory Comm'n, 1997) [hereinafter KENNEY, RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT], availableat https://repository.unm.edu/dspace/handle/1928/2794.
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Committee that the current status of water planning of most states does not
require a "top down" regional planning initiative.
The current situation on the Lower Colorado River with respect to
developing plans for meeting anticipated shortage conditions in California,
Arizona, and Nevada is illustrative of how the states and the Commission
might function under the Model Compact. On the Lower Colorado the
Supreme Court held in Arizona v. Californiathat under the Boulder Canyon
Project Act the Secretary of the Interior has plenary power to allocate the
stored water made available by the Hoover Dam for use in those three
states.93 However, the Secretary has not unilaterally taken the initiative to
exercise that power to develop a "comprehensive federal plan" for meeting
the anticipated shortages. Rather, the three Lower Division states of
Arizona, California, and Nevada, through a coordinated process of
discussions and hydrologic modeling, have been given the opportunity to
develop projects and programs in their individual states that they believe
will best meet their needs. Their tentative proposals, sent to the Secretary
in February of 2006, would, inter alia, defer certain major projects planned
by Nevada and substitute others of benefit to all three states for an interim
period until the Nevada projects are on line. The Secretary, exercising the
authority to review and perhaps modify some of the proposals, much in the
manner as proposed for the Model Compact Commission, would hope to
find agreement among all seven basin states for final secretarial action, but
would be authorized to implement the proposed modifications in any
event.
The Model Compact in essence provides a forum for each basin
state to review the proposed projects and programs of the other basin states
and make recommendations for mutually beneficial adjustments. Where
those recommendations make sense to a majority of the Commission
members, the Commission would have the authority to make such
adjustments and to review new projects and programs with significant
interstate impacts for conformity to the regional consensus.
B. Conjunctive Use
Conjunctive use of natural and artificial water storage facilities and
of such facilities and subsurface aquifers for the storage and management
of water has long been practiced in a number of western states with good
results and is increasingly being utilized to address shortage issues, as the
Western Water Policy Review Advisory Commission noted in its 1998

93.

373 U.S. 546, 565-69, 585-95 (1963) (No. 8, Orig.).
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report. 94 On an interstate basis, the Secretary of the Interior, at the initiative
of the seven Colorado River Basin states, is currently studying the
conjunctive use of Lakes Mead and Powell on the Colorado River and
underground storage by agencies in Arizona and California to minimize the
impacts of shortage conditions under the Colorado River Compact and
other components of the so-called Law of the River. Consequently, Article
VII.C directs the Commission to study, encourage, and develop plans for
conjunctive use of such facilities in the Basin.

94. W.WATERPOL'YREV. ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 2, at2-6,3-8,3-10to3-11,5-6, 5-20
(1998).
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ARTICLE VIII
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPACT OBLIGATIONS AND
RESOLUTION OF OTHER DISPUTES
A.

Enforcement of Compact Obligations
(1) Alleged Violation and Response
(a) Upon the basis of Division monitoring or substantial
verified factual evidence from a reliable, identified third
party that a signatory party is (a) not maintaining
required stream flows, (b) impermissibly exceeding its
Compact apportionment, or (c) permitting point source
discharges or non-point source land use practices or
activities that are violating Commission approved
interstate water quality standards, the Commission shall
request the representative for that party to respond to
such allegation in writing within 30 days. Such response
shall either (a) concede the accuracy of the facts
underlying the allegation, but assert that the situation is
attributable to specified actions or force majeure events
beyond its control; (b) concede the accuracy of the
allegation and propose a schedule for detailed remedial
action to be funded solely by such member; or (c)
dispute, with specification, the allegation in whole or
part and request further consultation with the Division.
(b) A member's formal concession before the Commission
of a Compact violation and implementation of a
Commission approved plan for remedial actions shall
excuse such member from liability to any Commission
member or its agencies for any damages sustained as a
result of such violation, provided that nothing herein
shall adversely affect the rights of private parties to
damages.
(2) Commission Investigation
The Commission member's response shall be promptly
referred to the Division for review and submittal of a
recommended course of action to the Commission within 30
days. With respect to concessions under paragraph A(1)(a),
the Division shall recommend that either (a) the alleged
violation be excused by the Commission as beyond the
member's control, (b) the member's proposed remedial action
be approved, or (c) the member's proposed remedial action
be modified and approved in whole or part.
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Dispute Resolution Referral
With respect to the member's disputation of the allegation, if
further discussions do not resolve the dispute within 45 days,
the dispute resolution procedures provided for in part B of
this Article may be initiated by any Commission member. No
compact party shall sue for damages during the pendency of
such proceedings before the Commission.
(4) Enforcement of Sanctions
Failure to resolve the dispute through the alternative dispute
resolution process shall authorize the Commission to (a)
suspend the voting rights of the alleged offending party
under the Compact; (b) suspend any ongoing or planned
implementation of Commission projects or programs
benefiting that party, including supplemental apportionments; or (c) as a last resort, take appropriate judicial action
for injunctive relief to remedy the alleged violation and allow
the signatory states to seek damages for such violation.
Dispute Resolution
(1) Duty to Seek Dispute Resolution
Any dispute respecting the interpretation of the Compact or
any Commission order, rule, regulation, or action issued or
taken thereunder, including reliance on contested scientific
data, shall first be presented by a signatory party to the
Commission for possible resolution before seeking judicial
relief. A party's failure to do so or to pursue such resolution
in good faith shall subject it to liability to any defendant
parties who are parties to later litigation regarding that
dispute for their litigation costs, regardless of the outcome of
such litigation.
(2) Commission Referral to Council or Division
A petition for dispute resolution shall be filed with the
Commission clearly defining the dispute and the disputants'
positions, supported by such written statements of material
facts and arguments as the Commission may by rule provide.
The Commission shall require the parties to meet and confer
and to exchange information regarding the dispute. If the
matter is not resolved within 30 days, the Commission shall
refer the petition to the Council or Division, depending on the
subject matter of the dispute, for initial resolution. The
Commission may establish categories of disputes for
resolution depending on their importance or urgency and
direct the Council and Division to schedule them for
resolution accordingly.
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Appeal to the Commission
(a) If a dispute cannot be resolved by the Council or
Division within an agreed upon schedule, a petitioner
party may appeal to the Commission for a decision.
(b) If a petitioner party is dissatisfied with the decision of
the Council or Division, it may appeal to the Commission within 60 days for a reversal or modification of
the decision appealed from. Failure to appeal the
decision of the Council or Division shall make such
decision the final action of the Commission on the
dispute.
Alternative Dispute Resolution
If the Commission cannot resolve the dispute within an
agreed upon schedule, the matter shall be designated for
attempted resolution by mediation or arbitration. If the
Commission does not specify a method for such alternative
dispute resolution, the method and procedures shall be
established by a majority vote of the petitioner party and
other signatory parties with a substantial interest in the
dispute. A party's interest is substantial if resolution of the
dispute seems likely to result in significantly decreasing the
amount or quality of water available to it; significantly
impairing its ability to monitor or administer water use,
availability, or quality; or significantly increasing its financial
obligations. The method for selecting mediators or arbitrators
and their qualifications shall be determined by the petitioner
party and other parties with a substantial interest in the
dispute by majority vote. If the interested parties cannot reach
agreement on any of the methods and procedures, the
Commission shall decide the matter.
Exhaustion of Commission Authority
When the Commission has decided a dispute or it has been
the subject of an unsuccessful alternative dispute resolution
procedure, the parties to the dispute shall be deemed to have
exhausted their administrative remedies under the Compact
and may initiate litigation to resolve the dispute in any court
of competent jurisdiction free of the sanction imposed by
section B(1) of this Article.
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ARTICLE VIII COMMENTARY
ENFORCEMENT OF COMPACT OBLIGATIONS
AND RESOLUTION OF OTHER DISPUTES
Many western compacts require unanimity of the signatory parties
for official action enforcing seemingly clear compact obligations or
interpreting ambiguous compact provisions, thus conferring a veto power
in a single state that can preclude its compact partners from administrative
enforcement of asserted compact rights and obligations or clarification of
compact terms. Although some two-state compacts provide a tie-breaking
mechanism to avoid this problem,95 absent such an express provision, the
Supreme Court will not dictate some kind of tie-break procedure. 9 This
situation gives leverage to an upstream state alleged to be in violation of a
compact to "stonewall" discussions and negotiations in the commission
forum, since by virtue of its geographical advantage (for example,
"highority is better than priority") it may have already stored or used the
volumes in dispute. This necessarily forces its compact partners to seek
Supreme Court relief, which can be just as expensive and time consuming
as equitable apportionment litigation, if not more so. Thus, Kansas and
Texas have been driven to seek such relief under four compacts with their
upstream neighbors, Colorado, Nebraska, and New Mexico, and the results
in two of those cases may alter traditional compact commission behavior for
the better. In Texas v. New Mexico, the Court held New Mexico liable for
damages for breach of its obligations under the Pecos River Compact97 and
the Texas claim was settled for $14 million.98 On the Arkansas River, the
Court held that Colorado's breach of the Arkansas River Compact subjected
it not only to damages but also to a substantial amount of prejudgment
interest. 99 The Court ultimately awarded Kansas $38 million."°° Compact
litigation plainly now has a substantial new cost factor beyond lawyers and
experts. In Kansas v. Nebraska, Kansas waived any damage claim as part of
the settlement of the case. 1 '
To implement a principal purpose of the Model Compact to avoid
interstate litigation in the Supreme Court, the Advisory Committee
unanimously stressed the importance of the Commission having adequate

95. See supra note 29.
96. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564-567 (1983) (No. 65, Orig.).
97. 482 U.S. 124, 129-32 (1987) (No. 65, Orig.).
98. Texas v. New Mexico, 494 U.S. 111, 111 (1990) (No. 65, Orig.). See also Pecos River
Compact, ch. 184, 63 Stat. 159 (1949).
99. 533 U.S. 1, 11 (2001) (No. 105, Orig.).
100. Kansas v. Colorado, 543 U.S. 86 (2004) (No. 105, Orig.).
101. 538 U.S. 720 (2003) (No. 126, Orig.).
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authority to enforce the Compact obligations against the signatory parties
and to resolve other disputes under the Compact. Article VIII thus provides
an administrative procedure for Commission consideration of (1) claims
that a signatory party is not in compliance with one or more of its Compact
obligations, and (2) disagreement or uncertainty over the interpretation of
Compact language or Commission orders, regulations, or guidelines.
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court has approved the creation of dispute
resolution mechanisms in recent settlements of interstate equitable
apportionment and compact litigation in Nebraska v. Wyoming10' and Kansas
v. Nebraska,"°3 Article VIII builds on the systems approved in those two
cases.
A.

Enforcement of Compact Obligations
(1) Violations

A party alleged to be in violation of any Compact obligation may
concede the accuracy of the Complainant's asserted facts and either plead
a force majeure defense or concede the violation and propose detailed
remedial action. Conceding the claimed violation and implementing a
Commission approved plan of remedial action would relieve the party of
any liability to any Commission member or its agencies, but not private
parties, for any damages resulting from the violation. This provision is
designed to encourage candor, cooperation, and compliance. In the
alternative, the party may dispute the claimed violation and request further
consultation with the Division. The party's response shall be referred to the
Division for discussion and a recommended course of action. If the matter
is not resolved before the Division within 45 days, any Commission
member may invoke the dispute resolution procedures of subpart B herein.
Legal action for injunctive relief or damages would be prohibited for the
duration of the pending proceedings.
(2)

Sanctions

Failure to resolve the dispute shall authorize the Commission to
suspend the party's voting rights and the benefits of any projects or
programs under the Compact, including supplemental apportionments,
and, as a last resort, to seek injunctive relief against the party and authorize
the other party states to seek damages.

102.
103.

534 U.S. 40 (2001) (No. 108, Orig.) (Decree).
538 U.S. 720.
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Resolution of Other Disputes

Article VIII.B(1) imposes a mandatory duty on a compact party to
first seek resolution of any dispute under the Compact pursuant to the
procedures provided in Article VIII before initiating litigation. Failure to do
so subjects such party to the obligation to pay all of the litigation costs of the
parties who may later become involved in any litigation on the subject in
dispute, which recent experience has shown can be substantial. The goal is
to keep the parties involved in good faith discussions regarding such issues
until an administrative resolution by the Commission or a negotiated
agreement among the parties is achieved.
A petition for dispute resolution would first be filed with the
Commission, which would direct the parties to meet, confer, and exchange
data about the dispute. If the dispute is not resolved, the Commission shall
refer it to either the Council or Division, depending on the subject matter
of the dispute, for an initial decision. If the dispute cannot be resolved
within an agreed upon timeframe or upon the issuance of a timely decision
by the Council or Division, the matter may be appealed to the Commission.
Failure to do so shall make the Council or Division decision the final action
of the Commission."
Article VIII.B(4) provides that, if the Commission cannot decide an
appealed matter within an agreed upon timeframe, it would be designated
for attempted resolution by mediation or arbitration, either binding or nonbinding, as a majority of the affected parties shall agree upon. Which
method to employ and the details of such procedure are left to the affected
parties rather than prescribing a particular procedure, to the end that the
affected parties may adapt them to the nature of the dispute and continue
discussing possible resolution as long as possible. Some commenters
suggested it would be better to provide certainty as to the process to be
followed by mandating it in the compact. However, the authors believe that
the discussions involved in choosing a particular procedure and a mediator
or arbitrator may well be conducive to settlement of the dispute.
Following a Commission decision or exhaustion of the alternative
dispute resolution process, any party may initiate litigation free of the
compact sanction of paying the other parties' litigation costs. 05

104.
105.

Articles VIII.B(2) and (3).
Article VIII.B(5).
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ARTICLE IX
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
A.

Interagency Coordination
The Commission, Council, and Division representatives shall be
responsible for maintaining liaison with and reporting Commission
activities or requests to their respective constituencies. When a vote
is to be taken on a matter and there are conflicting views within the
state, tribal, or federal constituent agencies, the representative shall
make a good faith effort to achieve a consensus position. Where
such a consensus cannot be achieved, the representative shall
nevertheless vote a single position, noting any significant
dissenting views.

B.

Advisory Committee
(1)

(2)

The Commission shall appoint a multi-interest, multidisciplinary Advisory Committee whose membership shall
include, for such terms as the Commission deems
appropriate, representatives of (a) the general public with
recognized interests in the use of water resources of the Basin
for beneficial purposes, including, as applicable, irrigation,
municipal and domestic use, power generation, navigation,
recreation, fish and wildlife habitat maintenance, aesthetic
enjoyment, livestock forage maintenance, industrial use, and
spiritual or religious uses; (b) selected subbasins of regional
significance; (c) regional federal representatives of the Bureau
of Reclamation, U.S. Geological Survey, Fish and Wildlife
Service, National Marine Fisheries Service, Environmental
Protection Agency, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission,
Corps of Engineers, and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, if conducting programs in the
Basin; and (d) academicians or private sector consultants with
recognized expertise in surface and subsurface water
hydrology, fish and wildlife, water resource economics, water
quality, biology, and numeric modeling. A member with
several qualifications may be considered to fulfill the
requirements for each of those specialty areas.
The Committee shall meet at least twice a year, once with the
Council and once with the Commission, and at the further
call of either body. The Committee's responsibilities shall be
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(1) to identify present and future problems or initiatives
related to the Compact with respect to the uses of the Basin's
waters and to recommend necessary and appropriate means
to address those matters, either by action of the Commission
or state or federal legislation or administrative action, and (2)
to provide its views on any matters presented to it by the
Commission. The Commission shall provide a reasonable per
diem expense allowance for Committee attendees requesting
such reimbursement.
C.

Reports
The Commission shall keep the public informed of its ongoing
activities through an electronic website or such other methods as
the Commission determines appropriate. It shall also prepare an
annual report in electronic and printed formats that shall contain
budgetary and financial information and relevant statistics, data,
and interpretative commentary respecting the use and condition of
the Basin's waters as well as a summary of meetings with the
Advisory Committee and significant Commission program
activities. The annual report shall be distributed to the legislative
and executive branches of the signatory parties and their
administrative agencies conducting programs in the Basin and be
available for purchase by the general public.
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ARTICLE IX COMMENTARY
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
During preparation of the Model Compact the Advisory Committee
stressed the importance of federal, state, tribal, and local interagency
in the allocation and management of interstate water
coordination
16
resources.

0

A. Communication and Consensus
Article IX.A provides that the Commission, Council, and Division
representatives are responsible "for maintaining liaison with and reporting
Commission activities or requests to their respective constituencies." This
provision was included specifically both to mandate and to facilitate
interagency coordination. Of perhaps greater significance is the language
contained in Article IX.A regarding the responsibility of Council and
Division representatives to "make a good faith effort to achieve a consensus
position" when there are "conflicting views within the state, tribal or federal
constituent agencies...."

106. In fact, one prominent commentator on natural resources and environmental issues
has noted that the need for interagency coordination goes beyond simply the allocation and
management of water:
[Tihe watershed of the 1990s has become a focal point for addressing
fundamental issues of resource management and democratic administration,
emphasizing many of the ideas expressed a century earlier by John Wesley
Powell - including the importance of a regional perspective, the integration
of institutions for land and water, the link between environmental
sustainability and community stability, and participatory government.
KENNEY, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 92, at A-42.
The importance of interagency coordination among all levels of government has been
addressed by a number of other scholars, including Professor Dan Tarlock: "Protecting healthy
watersheds and restoring degraded ones is one of this country's major unmet environmental
challenges. Because watersheds do not respect political boundaries, effective watershed
conservation will require cooperation and coordination among all levels of government,
including local units." A. Daniel Tarlock, The PotentialRole of Local Governments in Watershed
Management, 20 PACE ENvTL. L. REV. 149, 149 (2002). The "spirit of John Welsey Powell" was
also invoked by Barbara Cosens in her discussion of the coordination mechanisms contained
in the Fort Belknap Compact between the State of Montana and the Fort Belknap Indian Tribe:
[Tihe compact does establish institutions that set the stage for the residents
of the valley itself, in the spirit of John Wesley Powell, to resolve future water
problems within the basin. The compact does this by setting up a system of
coordination between disparate governmental entities, thus providing a
forum for future dialogue on the direction of the valley with respect to water.
Barbara Cosens, A New Approach in Water Management or Business as Usual? The Milk River,
Montana, 18 J.ENVTL. L. & LrrIG. 1, 49 (2003).
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The purpose of this language is to establish both goals and
expectations regarding communication between and among the signatory
parties. The importance of such communication on a practical level has
been addressed by a member of the Advisory Committee who is also the
Colorado representative on a number of compact commissions. With regard
to the Costilla Creek Compact, he concluded that, "[a]lthough streamf low
gauging stations equipped with remote access instrumentation and the
Operating Manual with an electronic accounting spreadsheet are available
to assist in daily water administration, the communication and collaboration efforts among the water users and state administration officials are the
keys to successful water allocation.""0 7
B. Legitimacy and Transparency
The language of Article IX.C regarding reporting and publicity
requirements is representative of language contained in the vast majority
of interstate water compacts. Article IX.C imposes on the Commission a
duty to "keep the public informed" of Commission activities. To fulfill this
requirement, the Commission may use any method that the Commission
deems appropriate. If the Commission determines that additional reports
from the signatory parties are needed to properly inform the public, the
Commission has ample authority under Article IX.C to require such reports.
The Commission is also required to prepare an annual report,
which is to include budgetary and financial information, relevant statistics,

107. Knox, Costilla Creek Compact, supra note 33, at 476. The role of communication in
successful water allocation is illustrated by the La Plata River Compact:
Effective interstate water administration.. .is based upon knowing the
amount of water available at the two index streamflow gaging stations, the
amount and location of ditch diversions, and the travel time between key
locations in the system. Advancements in water measurement and reporting
technologies aid water officials in the daily administration of this ephemeral
river. For example, the two streamflow gaging stations are equipped with
remote sensing equipment that instantaneously measures river height at
fifteen minute intervals to complement the continuous streamflow recorders.
A satellite transmits this information at regular intervals. The information is
then transformed into streamflow amounts for viewing by water officials and
public water users in both states. This instant and perpetual source of
information provides an effective tool to monitor and distribute the greatly
varying water supplies to intrastate water users and to meet compact
delivery requirements with the highest level of efficiency and confidence. It
also subjects water administration officials to intense scrutiny by both
interstate and intrastate water users who may not have full appreciation or
knowledge of transit losses, the travel times between key locations, and the
changing river call priority.
Kenneth W. Knox, La Plata River Compact, supra note 24, at 116-17 (citations omitted).
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data, and an "interpretative commentary" regarding the water resources of
the basin. This report, which should also include a summary of Advisory
Committee meetings and significant Commission activities, is to be
"distributed to the legislative and executive branches of the signatory
parties and their administrative agencies conducting programs in the
Basin."' 08
The reporting and publicity requirements contained in Article IX.C
address the need for Commission activities to be both legitimate and
transparent. These requirements also facilitate interagency coordination and
are essential for meaningful stakeholder involvement.
C. Advisory Committee
An Advisory Committee, to be appointed by the Commission, is
established under Article IX.B. This Committee (which is to be both "multiinterest" and "multi-disciplinary")' °9 is intended to provide a means by
which individuals and both governmental and non-governmental entities
with water-related expertise and interests might be involved in Commission
activities. It is also intended to provide a means for public participation in
activities of the Commission, as are the provisions regarding open meetings.
Such participation by stakeholders is critical to both the success and the
legitimacy of Commission activities. It has been suggested that any entity
with authority analogous to that of the Commission needs to provide
opportunities for stakeholder participation. Specifically, the need for
decision-making mechanisms that facilitate public participation and
provide clear outcomes was noted."'
The importance of mechanisms to facilitate public participation was
stressed repeatedly by the Advisory Committee, echoing the views of many
commenters:
Integrating and resolving conflicts over land use, water
supply diversions, water quality protection, navigation, flood
damage reduction, recreation, hydropower, and ecosystem

108. Article IX.C.
109. See Article IX.B(1) for various suggestions of representatives.
110. Kenney, Institutional Options, supra note 23, at 839. Accord DuMars, supra note 33.
Public participation is also important regarding the development of appropriate models to be
used in river basin management: "By involving the various stakeholders early and often in
development of the technical analysis models, the study management team is hoping to build
trust and develop a solution that best reflects public values." Cardwell et al., supra note 35.
Accord Daniel P. Loucks, Watershed Planning:ChangingIssues, Processesand Expectations,WATER
RESOURCES UPDATE, No. 111, Spring 1998, at 38, 41 (the successful use of computer models
"depends in large part on the confidence and feeling-of-ownership stakeholders have in those
models").
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restoration in watersheds involves nothing less than the
active participation of all of impacted stakeholders. This
includes the participation of professionally trained ecologists,
economists, engineers, planners, and others. It includes the
involvement of appropriate Federal, state and local governmental agencies. But these professionals and government
agencies can not do this job by themselves. Watershed
planning today requires the contributions of all impacted
stakeholders having any interest in the resources of the
watershed."'
Given that issues relating to the allocation and management of
water resources are cross-cutting issues that involve multiple stakeholders,
differences between stakeholders are certain to become apparent whenever
the Commission proposes actions of various kinds. However, in order to
facilitate an integrated approach to water resources management, it is
necessary that these differences be both expressed and reconciled, if
possible: "Conflict among stakeholders has to be resolved by dialogue and
compromise. Somehow all stakeholders have to feel their concerns and
desires are being considered and that they are a part of an equitable
decision making process. " "'
It is reasonable to impose this obligation on the Commission, the
Council, and the Division. In fact, given that stakeholder interests tend to
be focused on specific issues or concerns, it is unlikely that implementation
of the Compact would be successful if it failed to include stakeholders in the
decision-making process.
In essence, the allocation and management of Basin water resources
involves nothing less than the active participation of all impacted
stakeholders. The provisions of Article IX are intended to help achieve this
goal.1"3 With regard to stakeholder involvement in the allocation and
management of interstate water resources, the importance of achieving
these goals was expressed by John Thorson, a prominent water lawyer and

111. Loucks, supra note 110, at 38,39. In a study of five large-scale water problems, Grigg
reached a similar conclusion: "The successes and failures shown in the cases suggest the
benefits of a comprehensive and collaborative approach with effective stakeholder involvement."
Neil S. Grigg, Management Frameworkfor Large-Scale Water Problems, 122 J. WATER RESOURCES
PLAN. & MGMT. 296, 298 (1996) (emphasis added).
112. Grigg, supra note 111; Loucks, supranote 110.
113. For example, the Commission is authorized under Article IV.F(1) to establish rules
regarding the conduct of Commission, Council, Division, and Advisory Committee meetings.
With only limited exceptions as provided by the Commission, it is expected that all meetings
of the Advisory Committee will be open to the public. The Commission may wish to provide
a process for the taking of comments from the general public during open meetings on topics
and at times for which there is significant public interest.
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member of the Advisory Committee:11"At
the end of the day, maybe the
4
process is as important as any result."

114. John E. Thorson, Visions of SustainableInterstateWaterManagementAgreements,43 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 347, 368 (2003).
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ARTICLE X
BUDGETING AND FUNDING
A.

B.

C.

D.

E.

Capital Budget
The Commission shall annually adopt a capital budget listing all
capital projects it proposes to undertake or continue during the
budget period and containing a statement of the estimated cost of
each project and the method of its financing.
OperatingBudget and Assessments
The Commission shall annually adopt a current operating expense
budget for each fiscal year, including (1) estimated expenses for
administration, operation, maintenance and repairs for each
project, together with its cost allocation, and (2) estimated revenues
from charges for supplemental apportionments and all other
sources. Following the Commission's adoption of the operating
budget, the Commission's executive director shall notify the
signatory parties and their principal budget officers of the amounts
due under existing cost sharing agreements for each project and the
amount required to balance the operating budget. Responsibility
for any remaining deficit shall be allocated equitably among the
signatory parties by unanimous vote of the Commission based
upon land area or population within the Basin, the relative size of
their respective apportionments, or such other equitable factors as
the Commission may determine.
Payment of Assessments
The signatory parties shall include the amounts so assessed in their
respective currently proposed budgets. Such amounts shall be
payable to the Commission in quarterly installments during its
fiscal year, provided that the Commission may draw upon its
working capital to finance its current expense budget pending
remittances by the signatory parties.
Sanctionsfor Failureto Pay Assessments
Failure of any signatory party to pay all of its assessment in a
timely fashion shall authorize the Commission to suspend the
delinquent party's voting rights under the Compact and any
ongoing or planned implementation of Commission projects or
programs, including supplemental apportionments, benefiting that
party until such assessment is paid.
Annual Independent Audit
(1) As soon as practical after the closing of the fiscal year, an
audit shall be made of the financial accounts of the
Commission. The audit shall be made by qualified certified

Winter 2007]

(2)

(3)

MODEL COMPACT

public accountants, selected by the Commission, who have no
personal interest direct or indirect in the financial affairs of
the Commission or any of its officers or employees. The
report of audit shall be prepared in accordance with accepted
accounting practices and shall be filed with the chairman and
such other officers as the Commission shall direct. Copies of
the report shall be distributed to each commissioner and shall
be made available for public distribution.
Each signatory party by its duly authorized officers shall be
entitled to examine and audit at any time all of the books,
documents, records, files, and accounts and all other papers,
things, or property of the Commission. The representatives of
the signatory parties shall have access to all books,
documents, records, accounts, reports, files, and all other
papers, things, or property belonging to or in use by the
Commission and necessary to facilitate the audit and they
shall be afforded full facilities for verifying transactions with
the balances or securities held by depositaries, fiscal agents,
and custodians.
The financial transactions of the Commission shall be subject
to audit by the General Accounting Office in accordance with
the principles and procedures applicable to commercial
corporate transactions and under such rules and regulations
as may be prescribed by the comptroller general of the United
States. The audit shall be conducted at the place or places
where the accounts of the Commission are kept.
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ARTICLE X COMMENTARY
BUDGETING AND FUNDING
The Model Compact tries to minimize the impact of its operations
and programs on the party treasuries by conferring broad financing powers
on the Commission and by authorizing pricing of supplemental
apportionments, user fees, and cost sharing arrangements in connection
with particular programs and projects, as well as taxation of the regional
beneficiaries of those programs."' The provisions of Article X regarding
budgeting and funding are representative of similar provisions contained
in a number of interstate water compacts. Articles X.A and X.B require the
Commission to adopt an annual capital and operating budget, respectively.
Once the capital and operating budgets have been adopted, the executive
director of the Commission is to notify the signatory parties of the
"amounts due under existing cost sharing agreements for each project and
the amount required to balance the operating budget."1 6
If any deficit remains after the Commission informs the signatory
parties of their respective obligations, the Commission is authorized to
allocate the deficit among the signatory parties "based upon land area or
population within the Basin, the relative size of their respective
apportionments, or such other equitable factors as the Commission may
determine."" 7
Under Article X.C, the signatory parties are obliged to pay the
amounts assessed by the Commission. Should a signatory party fail to pay
the assessments in a timely manner, the Commission is authorized under

115. See commentary on Article IV, supra. Alternative means of funding an entity such as
the Commission are discussed in John E. Thorson, A Proposalfor a Missouri River CorridorTrust,
23 PUs. LAND & REsouRcEs L. REV. 77, 90-98 (2002) (pt. VII. Trust Finances). In interstate basins
with significant water quality problems, such as the Great Lakes and Chesapeake Bay, a
compact commission might well consider the October 2004 proposal of the Chesapeake Bay
Watershed Blue Ribbon Finance Panel to take dramatic action to meet the $15 billion initial
capital costs and $2.7 billion annual operating costs of the bay restoration components of the
Chesapeake Bay Program. The Panel recommended establishing a Chesapeake Bay Financing
Authority capitalized by the federal and state governments on an 80/20 percent basis with the
capacity to make loans and grants for various projects. It would be charged with developing
a sustainable revenue stream derived from various state sources, such as surcharges on water
and sewer fees, septic fees, and development fees. CHESAPEAKE BAY WATERSHED BLUE RIBBON
FINANCE PANEL, SAVING A NATIONAL TREASURE: FINANCING THE CLEANUP OF THE CHESAPEAKE

BAY 4,24(2004), http://www.chesapeakebay.net/pubs/blueribbon/BlueRibbon-fullreport
.pdf. Maryland has already initiated one of the most innovative and progressive water quality
funding programs in the nation by imposing a $2.50 per month surcharge on sewer bills and
$30 per year on septic system owners. Id. at 27.
116. Article X.B.
117. Article X.B.
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Article X.D to suspend that party's voting rights and to suspend "any
ongoing or planned implementation of Commission projects or programs,
including supplemental
apportionments, benefiting that party until such
118
assessment is paid."
Though these provisions may sound a bit Draconian, they are
necessary to justly and equitably apportion the costs both of the
Commission and of Commission projects and programs. Absent such
provisions, signatory parties that have not paid their annual assessments
but that nonetheless benefit from the initiatives of either the Commission
or other signatory parties would become "free riders." One way to address
the "free rider effect" is for sanctions for the nonpayment of assessments to
be sufficiently stringent to deter such behavior.
The authors are of the opinion that the sanctions contained in
Article X.D should be sufficient regarding all of the signatory parties except
the United States (should the United States be a signatory party). Because
of Congress's misguided decision in 1997 to discontinue payment of its
share of the annual assessment of operating costs for both the Delaware
River Basin Commission (DRBC) and the Susquehanna River Basin
Commission (SRBC)," 9 it was felt necessary to include provisions for
sanctions for such default. Although these provisions might have little
deterrent effect on Congress if it chooses to disregard its sovereign
commitments under a compact, they should influence the states and tribes
to honor their commitments to fund the Commission's programs.

118.
119.

Article X.D.
As part of the 1997 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act, the
Congress deleted federal funding of the office of federal commissioner for the
DRBC and SRBC as well as the federal government's financial participation
as a signatory party to those compact commissions commencing in October
of 1997... .Statements in the July eleventh 1995 Congressional Record indicate
that the Congress felt that the compact commissions serve the states much
more than the federal go,,ernment, and that river basin management is
predominately a state co.tcein and should be funded accordingly.
Featherstone, ExistingInterstateCompacts, supra note 39, at 281. Accord Featherstone, Interstate
Organizations, supra note 39.
The decision to terminate federal contributions to the Delaware and Susquehanna
Basin Commissions allegedly was "influenced by a January 1995 report of the Heritage
Foundation that described the commissions as providing only regional benefits...." Based on
this recommendation, funding for the two commissions was not included in the FY 1998
budget. However, "Congress.. .made no effort to withdraw the federal government from the
compacts as it could under Section 1.4 of both compacts." Cairo, supranote 39, at 129 (citation
omitted).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 47

Article X.E imposes an annual audit requirement.1 20 As noted
previously, Commission operations need to be transparent if Commission
decisions are to be considered both legitimate and credible. The audit
requirement, particularly the provision of Article X.E(1) that the audit "shall
be made available for public distribution" so as to facilitate public
participation in Commission activities, is key to providing the requisite
transparency.

120. The language of Article X is derived from the Delaware River Basin Compact, art.
14.11, and Susquehanna River Basin Compact, art 15.11, which, because the United States is
a signatory party, necessarily must involve the General Accounting Office in an annual audit.
This assumes, of course, that the United States is paying its annual assessments. As recent
history has demonstrated, this is not a safe assumption. See supra note 119 and accompanying
text.
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ARTICLE XI
RELATIONSHIP OF COMPACT TO EXISTING LAW
A.

B.

State and Tribal Laws
Except as expressly preserved herein or in the congressional
legislation consenting to this Compact, any present or future state
or tribal laws or regulations that are irreconcilably inconsistent
with any provision of this Compact are superseded by such
Compact provisions.
FederalLaws
(1) Except as expressly preserved herein or in the congressional
legislation consenting to this Compact, any present federal
laws or regulations relating to the waters covered by this
Compact that are irreconcilably inconsistent with any
provision of this Compact are superseded by such Compact
provisions.
(2) Any future federal laws, regulations, or judicial or
administrative decisions that directly or indirectly negate or
significantly modify the Compact's interstate water
apportionments or the powers or programs of the
Commission without the consent of the signatory states shall
authorize the Commission, by a majority vote of the signatory
state members, to terminate the Compact, subject to the
conditions of Article II.B(2). Such termination shall be
effective 180 days after written notice by the Commission to
the President and Congress.
(3) For the purpose of providing a uniform system of laws
applicable to the Commission, the Council, the Division of
Scientific Analysis, and the Advisory Committee relating to
the making of contracts, conflicts-of-interest, financial
disclosure, open meetings, advisory committees, disclosure of
information, judicial review, and related matters, the federal
laws applicable to such matters, including but not limited to
the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq.), the
National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.),
and the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.
Appendix), shall apply to the extent that the Commission
shall deem appropriate.
(a) In applying the federal laws applicable to financial
disclosure under the preceding sentence, such laws shall
be applied to members of the Commission, the Council,
the Division of Scientific Analysis, and the Advisory
Committee without regard to the duration of their

108

C.
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service or the amount of compensation received for
such service.
(b) For the purpose of judicial review of any action of the
Commission or challenging any provision of this
Compact, notwithstanding any other provision of law,
the courts of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of any such review.
United States Supreme Court Decrees
Nothing in this Compact shall adversely affect any interstate water
allocation or other rights that a signatory state may have been
awarded by a United States Supreme Court decree in an equitable
apportionment or interstate compact action prior to entering into
this Compact, except where expressly provided in this Compact or
by unanimous vote of the Commission.
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ARTICLE XI COMMENTARY
RELATIONSHIP OF COMPACT TO EXISTING LAW
Parties involved in disputes over interstate water resources do not
necessarily live happily ever after following resolution of a conflict by
compact. As existing statutes and case law may be modified by the
ratification of an interstate water compact, existing interstate compacts may
be modified, either intentionally or inadvertently, by subsequent federal
statutes. Article XI addresses the relationship of the Model Compact to state
and tribal laws (Article XI.A), to federal law (Article XI.B), and to decrees
of the United States Supreme Court (Article XI.C).
In order to understand these relationships, it is important to
remember that an interstate water compact, once it has been ratified by the
party states and consented to by Congress, becomes "a law of the United
22
States."12' Consequently, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,'
such compacts as federal law would supercede inconsistent state laws,
unless the compact or the congressional consent legislation provides
otherwise." 2 In essence, in the event of a conflict over the allocation and

121. New Jersey v. New York, 523 U.S. 767, 811 (1998) (No. 120, Orig.) (quoting Cuyler v.
Adams, 449 U.S. 433,438 (1981) and citing Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 564 (1983) (No.
65, Orig.)).
In Texas v. New Mexico, a conflict arising under the Pecos River Compact, which
provided equal representation for both states, Texas asked the Supreme Court to fashion an
equitable remedy to resolve a deadlock on the Pecos River Commission by providing for a
tiebreaking vote. The Court refused, stating that such a fundamental restructuring of the
Commission would require congressional action because the Pecos River Compact became
federal law once it had been consented to by Congress. "[U]nless the compact to which
Congress has consented is somehow unconstitutional, no court may order relief inconsistent
with its express terms." 462 U.S. at 564. See also Pecos River Compact, ch. 184, 63 Stat. 159
(1949).
Consequently, "the United States Supreme Court has shown a firm unwillingness to
do anything other than enforce compacts according to their terms." Robert Haskell Abrams,
Interstate Water Allocation: A ContemporaryPrimerfor Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LflTLE ROCK L.
REV. 155, 157 (2002).
122. U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
123. [A] state statute is void to the extent that it actually conflicts with a valid
federal statute; and "[a] conflict will be found 'where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility....' Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963), or where state
'law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
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management of water resources between the requirements of a compact and
the requirements of state law, the requirements of the compact would
prevail. As Justice Douglas noted in Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co.:124
"Whenever the constitutional powers of the federal
government and those of the state come into conflict, the
latter must yield." Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12, 17
[T]he suggestion that this project interferes with the
[1927] ....
state's own program for water development and conservation
is likewise of no avail. That program must bow before the
"superior power" of Congress. 5
As with conflicts regarding the requirements of state law, the
potential also exists for compacts to conflict with the requirements of other
federal laws. In such situations, the established rule of statutory
construction is that, "[blecause the latest expression of the legislative will
prevails, the statute last passed will prevail over a statute passed prior to
it."

1 26

There was discussion among the Advisory Committee as to
whether Congress should consent to compacts that are inconsistent with the
provisions of federal law or whether Congress should enact new federal
laws that are inconsistent with the requirements of compacts. However, as
noted in the Commentary to Article IV regarding the authority of the
Commission, Congress has expressly reserved "the right to revoke, alter, or
amend its consent" when it has consented to about two-thirds of interstate
water compacts.127 Even without such a reservation, "Congress is generally
free to change its mind; in amending legislation Congress is not bound by

purposes and objectives of Congress.' Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67
(1941); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,526,540-41 (1977). Accord De
Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 363 (1976)" Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S.
151, 158 (1978).
Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 631 (1982) (internal citations omitted).
124. 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
125. Id. at 534-35 (internal citations omitted).
126. Norman J. Singer, 1A SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCrION § 23:18,
at 525-26 (6th ed. 2002 rev.).
127. MUYS, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS, supranote 40, at 292 n.59. See also supra note 15
and accompanying text.
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the intent of an earlier body. "1" However, the extent to which Congress is
"free to change its mind" is not without uncertainty.129
The provisions of Article XI reflect the fact that numerous interstate
water compacts may have been superseded or adversely impacted either in
whole or in part by subsequently enacted federal legislation."' An example

128. Community-Service Broad. of Mid-America, Inc. v. FCC, 593 F.2d 1102,1113 (D.C. Cir.
1978). The axiom that one Congress cannot bind a subsequent Congress is a well-established
principle of American jurisprudence. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)
(in contrast to a constitution, legislative acts are "alterable when the legislature shall please to
alter [them]"); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87,135 (1810) (noting the correctness of the
principle that "one legislature is competent to repeal any [law] which a former legislature was
competent to pass; and that one legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding
legislature"); Street v. United States, 133 U.S. 299,300 (1890) (statute "was not intended to have,
... [and] could not have, .... any effect on the power of a subsequent Congress" to enact a
different policy). The rationale for this rule is stated by Justice Brennan in his dissent in United
States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 45 (1977):
One of the fundamental premises of our popular democracy is that each
generation of representatives can and will remain responsive to the needs
and desires of those whom they represent. Crucial to this end is the assurance
that new legislators will not automatically be bound by the policies and
undertakings of earlier days.
129. After noting that "the Constitution gives to Congress certain plenary powers" and that
"Congress has at its disposal abundant authority to supervise and regulate the activities of
operational compacts in such a way as to insure that no violence is done by these compacts to
more compelling federal concerns," the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Tobin
v. United States, 306 F.2d 270, 273 (1962), noted:
Appellant argues.. that Congress can adequately protect every interest that
needs such protection because of the existence of an operational compact
without, in doing so, being forced to the extremity of rescinding its consent
under the compact clause, an action which appellant contends Congress has
no constitutional power to perform.
Appellant's assertion in this respect is not unpersuasive, since a holding
that Congress has the constitutional power to "alter, amend or repeal" its
consent under the compact clause can hardly be stated as a proposition of
universal applicability. A line marking the boundary between two states,
initially drawn by such states acting pursuant to an interstate compact, could
hardly be erased at some later date by Congress's enactment of hindsight
legislation purporting to repeal its consent to the compact by which such
boundary was initially determined. See the discussion in Hinderlider v.
LaPlataRiver and Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938) and cases cited
therein.
Id. at 273-74 (internal citations omitted).
130. For example, the Clean Water Act probably superceded many substantive provisions
of the New England Interstate Water Pollution Control Compact, 61 Stat. 682 (1947), the Ohio
River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, 54 Stat. 752 (1940), the Potomac River Basin Interstate
Compact, 54 Stat. 748 (1940), as amended, 84 Stat. 856 (1970), the Tennessee River Basin Water
Pollution Control Compact, 72 Stat. 823 (1958), and the Tri-State [Sanitation] Compact, 49 Stat.
932 (1935). See generally GEORGE WILLIAM SHERK, DIvIDING THE WATERS: THE RESOLUTION OF
INTERSTATE WATER CONFLICTS IN THE UNnTED STATES, 49-58 (2000) (ch. 5, "The Ecology of
Options").
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is the South Platte River Compact, a water allocation compact between
Colorado and Nebraska.' The Riverside Irrigation District sought a
nationwide temporary permit under section 404 of the Clean Water Act 32
to discharge sand and gravel during the construction of a dam. The Corps
of Engineers refused to issue the permit because operation of the proposed
dam, by adversely impacting critical habitat of the whooping crane, was
inconsistent with the requirements of the Endangered Species Act. 33 The
district court concurred, ruling that the Corps' district engineer properly
exercised his authority under the Clean Water Act and the Endangered
Species Act." The court also ruled that approval of the South Platte River
Compact by Congress did not limit congressional authority thereafter to
enact the Clean Water Act even though that Act affected state water rights
in a manner inconsistent with the Compact.' 35 In essence, the Riverside
decisions stand for the proposition that interstate water compacts are
subject to the provisions of subsequently enacted federal legislation,
perhaps the two most important being the Clean Water Act and the
Endangered Species Act, regardless of the impact of such legislation on
compact apportionments or programs approved by an earlier Congress.
Further, suppose Congress approves a compact providing for
delivery by an upstream state of a certain quantity of water to a
downstream state at specified times. Assume further that protection of the
critical habitat of an endangered species within the upper state requires it
to deliver more than its compact obligation to the downstream state(s) or
its compact obligation at different times. This imposes an unanticipated
burden on the upstream state and may provide an unanticipated and
perhaps inequitable windfall for the downstream state(s). Conversely, if the
endangered species is in the downstream state, that state may be required
to dedicate a substantial portion of its compact share to protect the species,
a situation that was not anticipated when the compact was negotiated. As
noted previously, under traditional rules of statutory interpretation, the
later Endangered Species Act arguably would supercede the previously
approved allocations. Unless the compact or the consent legislation makes
some provision for addressing this future inequity, the states are faced with
renegotiating the compact, a solution that might require a degree of
magnanimity that political pressures in one or more of the compact states

131. South Platte River Compact, ch. 46,44 Stat. 195 (1926). The terms of the Compact were
at issue in Riverside IrrigationDistrictv. Stipo, 658 F.2d 762 (10th Cir. 1981), on remand sub nom.
Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583 (D. Colo. 1983), affd 758 F.2d 508 (10th
Cir. 1985).
132. 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (permits for dredged or fill material).
133. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
134. Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 590 (D. Colo. 1983).
135. Id. at 587.
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or Congress might preclude, unless the Golden Rule is somehow made a
constitutional or statutory mandate.
The foregoing hypothetical appears to have become a reality in the
Rio Grande Basin in the interaction of the compact between Colorado, New
Mexico, and Texas and the Endangered Species Act. A recent study
concluded that the economic impacts of maintaining minimum annual
flows in the middle Rio Grande Basin for the endangered Rio Grande
Silvery Minnow produced a modest net benefit to New Mexico users
downstream of the critical habitat area, but that the "major beneficiaries to
maintaining an upstream habitat for the minnow include El Paso [Texas]
industrial and municipal water users, who would gain more than $1 million
per year during drought years."136 These types of conflicts, which are
illustrative of the types of conflicts that are virtually certain to emerge
increasingly over time, are addressed in Article XI.
Reflecting the scope of preemption discussed above, Article XI.A
provides that the Model Compact supersedes all state and tribal laws that

136. Frank A. Ward & James F. Booker, Economic Impacts of Instream Flow Protectionfor the
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow in the Rio GrandeBasin, 14 REvS. IN FISHERIES ScI. 187, 200-01 (2006).
The article's conclusions are of note:
This article estimated the economic impacts associated with one measure
for increasing instream flows to meet critical habitat requirements of the
endangered Rio Grande Silvery Minnow. Using an integrated model of the
hydrology, economics, and institutions of the Rio Grande Basin, a 44-year
simulation of future inflows to the basin was conducted to estimate economic
impacts of providing minimum acceptable flows for the minnow.
Economic impacts to New Mexico agriculture were estimated at a positive
$68,000 per year, distributed as a $149,000 loss to central New Mexico
agriculture. One unexpected result of the study was that farmers in the
Elephant Butte Irrigation District in southern New Mexico would gain
because of increased flows for the minnow ending up in Elephant Butte
Reservoir, downstream of the minnow's habitat. Our results indicate that
these gains by southern New Mexico agriculture could compensate losses
incurred by central New Mexico agriculture, with a residual net gain of
$68,000. Annual average benefits lost to New Mexico M&I water users was
a modest $24,000, produced by the increased cost of pumping from
groundwater sources after surface treatment facilities are built for
Albuquerque's M&I use of its San Juan Chama supplies. So the net annual
average change in economic benefit to New Mexico associated with instream
flow protection for the silvery minnow is a slightly positive $44,000.
The policy of year-round minnow flows produced a gain in benefit of
$203,000 per year for El Paso, Texas agriculture as well as a gain in benefit of
$1,275,000 for El Paso M&I users. The major beneficiaries to maintaining the
upstream habitat for the minnow include El Paso industrial and municipal
water users, who would gain more than $1 million per year during drought
years.
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are "irreconcilably inconsistent" with the provisions of the Compact. A
slightly different approach is reflected in the relationship between the
Model Compact and federal laws. Under Article XI.B(1), pre-existing federal
laws and regulations that are "irreconcilably inconsistent" with the
provisions of the Model Compact would be superseded by the Compact.
However, as reflected in the Riverside Irrigation District decisions, 137 the
authors believe that federal laws enacted following the approval of the
Model Compact that are "irreconcilably inconsistent" would probably
supersede the provisions of the Compact. Consequently, Article XI.B(2)
provides in relevant part that "[a]ny future federal laws, regulations or
judicial or administrative decisions that directly or indirectly negate or
significantly modify the Compact's interstate water apportionments or the
powers or programs of the Commission without the consent of the
signatory states shall authorize the Commission, by a majority vote of the
signatory state members, to terminate the Compact.... While the signatory
parties may not be able to change the will or inadvertent error of Congress,
they retain their authority to terminate a compact that Congress may have
altered substantially, which should prompt Congress to give more attention
to the potential impact of water-related legislation on existing compacts and
attempt to reasonably accommodate them.
Article XI.B(3) authorizes the Commission to determine the extent
to which federal laws applicable to the making of contracts, conflicts-ofinterest, financial disclosure, open meetings, advisory committees,
disclosure of information, judicial review, and related matters should be
applicable to the Commission. Federal laws potentially applicable to this
interstate administrative entity would include the Administrative
Procedure Act,138 the National Environmental Policy Act, 139 and the Federal
Advisory Committee Act." With regard to judicial review of actions arising
under the Model Compact, Article XI.B(3)(b) provides for exclusive
jurisdiction in the courts of the United States. This provision reflects the
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act 4'
regarding the authority of the congressionally created Northwest Power
Council on the Columbia River System and judicial review of Council
actions.
Finally, Article XI.C makes it clear that the Model Compact is not
intended to affect adversely "any interstate water allocation or other rights"
that may have been awarded to a signatory party by the Supreme Court

137.

See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text.

138.
139.
140.
141.

5 U.S.C. §§ 500-551, 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 4301, 5335, 5372, 7521 (2000).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 43314335, 4341-4347 (2000).
5 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-15 (2000).
16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(4) (2000).
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prior to ratification of the Compact. There are, however, two exceptions to
this limitation. The Model Compact could adversely affect such rights if the
adverse impacts were "expressly provided
[for] in this compact" or "by
14 2
unanimous vote of the Commission."

142. Similar language is contained in the Delaware River Basin Compact, art. 3.3(a), 75 Stat.
688, 692-93 (1961) (requiring "unanimous consent of its members [to] authorize and direct an
increase or decrease in any allocation or diversion permitted or releases required by the
decree" in New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954) (No. 5, Orig.)).

